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More  people  worldwide  have  access  to electric  power-  but the
overall performance  of sector utilities  is deteriorating. Bank
lending  should  place  greater  emphasis  on improved  economic,
financial,  and managerial  efficiency.
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dPlc,Planning,  and Research
Energy  Development
A review of about 300 power projects financed  *  Evaluating power projects with better
by the World Bank and IDA between 1965 and  understanding of power, energy, sector, and
1983 shows a declining trend in sector perform-  national economic linkages.
ance.  More people have arcess to electric
power, and more kilowatt hours are gencrated  * Striking a better investment balance be-
per capita, but overall sector performance has  t'veen power generation and distribution.
declined, while the quality of service is poor and
shows no signs of improving.  *  Improving the quality of existing services
(and reducing losses) through rehabilitation and
Therefore in its operations, the Bank should  maintenance - rather than by simply expanding
put more emphasis on:  the system.
Making energy production and allocation  *  Providing service on a priority basis to the
more efficient (supplying electricity at the  productive sectors, such as indust-v and (when
lowest cost and basing prices on real marginal  economically justified) agriculture.
costs) rather than using the supply of power to
meet other goals such as social equity.  *  Using more risk and sensitivity analysis,
and more scenario-oriented "what-if" treatment
* Increasii 5g incentives to make utilities more  of uncertainty in project preparation work rather
efficient and productive.  than at appraisal.
. Encouraging sector restructuring and  *  Setting more realistic targets for physical
institudonal refe,m, including greater private  and financial performance and clearer identifica-
participation, to improve the social compact  tion of constraints on meeting those targets.
between government, consumers, and the
electric utility.  *  Developing a better institutional memory
for project data.
This paper, a product of the Energy Development Division, Industry and Energy De-
partment, has also appeared as an Industry and Energy Departnent Working Paper.
Copies are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC
20433.  Please contact Mary Femandez, IENED Publications Manager, room S4-
037, extension 33637.
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1. EXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
1.1 Overview  and General  Observations
This retrospective  study was carried out to review power projects
financed by the Bank from 1965  to 1983. The main objectives of the study
were to:
(I)  assess the  performance of  power projects and institutions In
terms of key physical and financial Indicators, and adherence  to
loan covenants;
(Q)  assess sector performance  In terms of the Increase In access  to
service,  and service price, quality, and cost;
(ill)  identify  issues and  causal factors  relating  to  good  or  poor
performance;  and
(Iv)  determine  options  and make  recommendations  to Improve  project
and sector performance.
Project Completion Reports (PCR's) and Project Performance
Audit Reports (PPAR's)  were the princqpal  sources of data, supplemented
by  information from Staff Appraisal Reports (SAR's) and other specific
Bank documents,  where  necessary.
Since both the Bank  and Its borrowers  have  had many  decades  of
experience In Identifying, analyzing  and solving power sector problems, n
Is unlikely that any new Investigation  would produce hitherto unsuspected
or startling conclusions. Also, broad generalizations  are difficuit to make,
particularly across  a  wide  range of  developing countries In  different
reglons, and over a long period of time.  Nevertheless,  this study does
present  fresh  Insights  concerning the  electric  sector  and  a  better
understanding of several fundamental  Issues  that have emerged recently.
It also helps prioritize the key Issues,  Identify  causal  factors, and determine
practical options available  to decisionmakers,  who wish to Improve  electric
utility  performance.  Finally, the report Is designed to facilitate the pro--5 -
acts e use of the retrospective  study results, in order to Improve  the quality
of future lending.
A central  theme  that recurs  throughout  the analysis  Is the need  for
greater  ficlency  In the power sector.  The Issue Is not that power Is
unimportant  to modern economies,  os that this capital Intensive  sector will
not continue to merit significant resources In the future, but rather that
developments over the  past few years  have highlighted the  need to
Improve efficiency In the production and use of electricity.  Thus, both
governments  and donors  would be well advised  to more carefully scrutinize
continued requests for resource  flows to the sector, and to actively search
for methods  of Increasing  technical,  financial and managerial  effectiveness.
The results of this study confirm that the developing countries
have made significant  gains in  terms  of  access to,  and  per  capita
consumption  of electricity over the last few decades. Other evidence  also
suggests that In  many countries the power sector tends to  be better
organized  and perform better than other sectors of the economy.  However,
during periods of high growth, power utilities have  had to weather  oil price
Increases and high Inflation and have been hampered In their efforts to
attain financial  targets because  governments  have  been  slow In responding
to changing conditions and In granting  tartff Increases. The study confirms
that both the Bank and Its borrowers should take early steps to  arrest
deteriorating trends, given that power Investments  absorb as much as half
of all public Investments  In some countries, and often are the cause of
severe debt-related and macroeconomic  stresses.  While Bank staff have
frequently diagnos-d such problems In the past, recommended  remedial
measures have  been  less  effective  because of  over-riding  political
priorities.
The evidence available  tends to confirm that the soclal compact
on which power utilities are based and th9 assumptions  under which they
operate within developing economies need to be rescrutinized. Over the
past decade, the decline In sector performance  has been paralleled by a
shift towards large monolithic  government-controlled  electric utilities. This-6-
centralizing  trend is based on several  reasons,  such as: the high growth of
the  power  sector,  economies of  scale  In  planning  and  uperaticns,
opportunities for Improving coordination and efficlency, reduced reserve
margins and reliability gains,  the need  to undertake  larger and longer term
Investments,  and pressures for nationalization  and elimination of foreign
ownership. Altho'  -'  some of this rationtale  for concentration  Is still valid,
there Is a growing  -nsensus  abcut the urgent need for greater efficiency
and organizational  rtiorm In the power  sector.
While the criteria  underlying government policy  In the power
sectoir  rarely have  been spelled out expilcitly, several  of them nevertheless
are discernible. First, most developing countries feel that power is  an
engine for growth and modernization  that should be sustained through
centrally directed Investments  and activity.  Second, electric utilities are
considered a tool for addressing  social equity and employment  Issues and
Improving quality of life.  Third, the sector Is sometimes perceived as a
vehicle  for  raising  resources and  taxing  away  surpluses  (although
significant implementation  problems  are acknowledged).
Although the  availability of  electric power has brought many
benefits,  the scarcity of resources  underlines  the need  to focus attention on
sector weaknesses  and Improve  the efficiency of resource use.  In some
cases  the  failure  of  the  existing  social  compact  between  national
governments,  power  producers  and consumers,  Is not due to shortcomings
of the policy criteria themselves, but to the Imprecise Interpretation  and
application  of  these  objectives.  Thus,  the  desire  for  growth  and
modernization mentioned above has resulted In unquestioned  funding of
power needs, continuous central government subsidies to  the  sector,
nonoptimal or unbalanced Investments,  and lack of productive efficiency
and Incentives  to maintain  technical and financial discipline.  Social  equity
and smployment objectives have  led to excessive  subsidies  to consumers,
Inefficient pricing, and Inadequate  resource mobilization. Attempts to tax
sector  surpluses have created highly  skewed price  structures, cross
subsidies, and Incorrect price signals.  Altogether, this environment has
encouraged a casual attitude towards official  Interference, resulting In-7-
excessive and counterproductive  government  intervention In nearly every
aspect  of utility activities.
The foregoing  consideratlons  and the desperate  circumstances  of
many developing  country power utilltles have  generated  pressures  for new
approaches. In particular,  there appears  to be considerable  Interest In the
scope for more decentralization  and greater private participation, as one
means of Improving power utility performance and relieving developing
country govern  ments of the crippling economic burden of financing the
chronic deficits of these state-owned  enterprises. The history of the utility
sector In Industrialized  countries Indicates  periods of fierce Intemal debate
and  Introspection, followed by  significant  policy  reforms to  adapt to
changing external circumstances. The rapidly evolving environment  faced
by  developing country utilities  today  suggests that  ft  would be  both
appropriate and healthy to carry out such a self-examinatlon,  rather than
adhering rigidly to an outdated  framewc-k.
In evaluating future options In the power sector, ft Is useful to
recall first principles.  Economic efficiency requires both productive and
allocative efficiency.  The first criterion Is met by supplying electricity at
least cost (i.e.,  through efficient Investment  and operation),  and the second
requires that price equals marginal cost  A new outlook for the power
sector  should seek to satisty  these criteria In relation to three factors.
First, conditions within the utility  must provide Incentives for
technical, financial and managerial  efficlency.  Remedial  measures must
address a  number of  problems that  have plagued these  insttutlons,
lncludlhg:  weak  planning,  Inefficient  operation  and  Inadequate
maintenance,  high technical  and non-technical  losses, low quality of supply
and frequent power failures, Inability to  raise prices to  meet revenue
requiraments,  poor management,  excessive  staffing and low salaries,  poor
staff morale and performance,  undue government  Interference,  and so on.
For many utilities these problems have persisted over time despite  fforts
to jdentlfy  and  correct  the  causes through  consuitant  studies  and
Institutional  development  programs.-8-
Second,  the  national  environment within  which  the  utility
functions might be restructured to Improve perlormance. Key aspects  to
be considered Include clear-cut government policy guidelines for utility
management, delegation of authority to  Implement agreed policies and
corresponding accountability,  a rational regulatory  framework,  government
non-interference In daily sector activities, and reforms In the financial
climate and access  to capital.
Third, dealing with exogenous  factors outside the pollcymakers'
control requires  that decisions be made  with due allowance  for uncertainty.
Thus, unpredictable changes In demand forecasts, Inflation, exchange
rates, Interest rates, and fuel prices, require a new mindset and scenario-
oriented approach to  decisionmaking, that  Is  quite different from the
deterministic methods  that were more useful In the past. Furthermore,  It Is
becoming Increasingly  evident  that effective  policy must be determined  by
using a holistic framework  that fully accounts  for key microeconomic and
intersectoral linkages - an approach  that Is more comprehensive  than the
narrower,  intrase-'tor  analysis  used  earlier.
1.2 Summary  of Soecific Findings
Although availability, access to  service, and  consumption of
electricity have Increased, the overall quality of  supply and degree of
losses have  remained  unsatisfactory  despite large power  Investments. It Is
not possible to discern a clear-cut trend In the movement  of average  unit
cost over the study period, partly because  of data uncertainties  caused  by
Inflation and exchange rate fluctuations. However,  it Is ciear that average
electricity prices have  consistently  lagged  behind  costs, while price-related
covenants  (that  Invariably  reflect  the  bare  minimum  of  financial
requirements),  have  frequently  been Ignored,  undermined,  or postponed.
The  results  of  this  study  Indicate  either  stagnation  at
unsatisfactory levels or a declining trend In overall sector performance.
During the past decade  fewer key project targets have  been achieved  than- 9 -
during the 1960's. Time overruns  have become more likely and greater In
number. Cost overruns  have  fluctuated, but delays in disbursemenis  have
Increased  steadily.  The financial perfermance of utilities also has been
poor as measured by Indicators such as the rate of return on revalued
assets, self-financ6ig ratio, operating ratio, debt service ratio, and days
receivable. Declines In performance  over time were already evident well
before the  first  oil  crisis  took  place in  1973-74.  Errors  In demand
forecasting  have sigrNificantly  increased  during the study period. Except  In
supply  constrained systems, the  overestimation of  demand In  many
countries has encouraged  overinvestment  and aggravated  financial  strains.
While  some  of  the  major  indicators  of  armance have
deteriorated,  others have  shown Improvement. For example,  most utilities
appear to  have met Institutional development targets over the  perlod.
Furthermore,  conformity with non-financial  covenants,  many of which are
related to Institution building goals, was good.  Nevertheless,  progress on
the  organizational front  has  not  been  able  to  reverse the  overall
performance  decline In the sector, probably because  the Institutional and
non-financial  targets were too modest or wrongly directed, and any gains
were overwhelmed  by more Important  exogenous  factors. The Implication
for future action by the Bank and its borrowers  Is that preoccupation  with
covenants and  conditionalities in  non-critical  areas, and  satisfaction
derived  from  meeting such  targets, should  not  be  allowed to  divert
attention from more fundamental  problems  that have led to overall erosion
of the sector.  These problems can be assessed In terms of  specifli
performance  indicators,  discussed  In the next section.
GLOBAL  PERFORMANCE  INDICATORS
The  study  h'6nz  confirmed the  general Impression that while
access to  service has improved in terms of the average kilowatt hours
generated  per capita and the percentage  of population served, the quality
of service Is poor and has shown no sign ot Improvement. In many  cases,
service has  deteriorated as  utilities  place unduly great  emphasis on-10 -
extending  supply to new areas,  often at the expanse  of maintaining  existing
Installations and quality of service to existing customers.  There Is thus
evidence of an Inefficient and unbalanced use of resources.  The high
levels of losses and the power outage costs associated  with poor service
quallty all result In economic losses that were not expected at the time of
project appraisal,  and moreover,  could have  been  avoided.
Access  to Service  and Investment  Patterns
The liicreased access  to service Is evidenced by the trend In the"
average level of  per  capita generation and Installed capacity.  These
Improvements  In access have  required sustained  hgh  rates of Investment
and expansion In total assets of up to 15%  p.a. In many  countries, which is
rather a remarkable  achievement. Data  for 51 countries between  1968  and
1982  showed that, on average,  generation  Increased  by 7% p.a., from 196
kWh/capita  to 529 kWh/capita,  and Installed  capacity Increased  by nearly
8%.  The average  growth rate of GDP  per capita was almost 2% over the
same  time period, increasing  from US$837  to US$1093  (in 1980  prices).
In over 90%  of countries, growth rates of generation  and Installed
capacity per capita were more than double the real growth rate for GDP
and In 57% of countries they were more than three times the real growth
rate. The average  growth  rate of connections  for 29 projects for which data
were available was 9% p.a., or about two and a half times the average
population growth rate.  Access  to electricity also Increased  considerably
faster than the GDP growth rate per capita.  Indeed, even In countries
where there was little or negative economic growth over the period, the
majority had more than a 5% annual  growth In generation  and better than a
3% annual  growth Ira  connec^lons.
Power utilities face a double burden of maintaining  service to the
rapidly growing number of customers now connected to the network, and
further  expc"ding  the  system.  The  results  of  this  study  raise the
fundamental question  whether  single  minded  pursult  of  rapid  and-11  -
sustaled  expansion  Is possible  or Indeed  desirable In view of the difficulty
utilities and governments  will have  In carrying on as In the past. The need
for electric power to suppcrt economic and Industrlal growth must be
examined In determining the priority for system expansion. The role of
demand  management and  conservation as  alternatives to  capacity
expanslon, the  availability of  substitute energy sources, and both the
volume  and  balance  of  Investments In  the  power  sector  must  be
considered In planning for growth In the system.  Finally, the size of a
power utility must  be determined  In relation  to the scope  of decisionmaking
required and the  capabilities of  management  to  fulfill  their  functions
efficiently.
Overall Investment  programs  appear  to have been carried out as
planned, but almost 20% of utihitles  were forced to reduce their programs
because  of budget and other constraints or a slowdown In demand. The
relative emphasis on  expansion at the  expense of  service quality Is
Indicated by the average  compositlon  of projects  financed  by the Bank.  The
project mix also reflects a bias towards larger projects with relatively few
procurement packages  that are easier to supervise. On the basis of the
total cost of projects at completion, the overall composition of projects
approved  during  the  period  1965-1980 was  38%  generatlon,  22%
transmission, 9% distribution, and 11% other components.  This mix
reveals a relative underfunding  of diztribution by the Bank, In comparison
with the other components of the system.  Typically, one might expect
about 30% of total Investment to  be required for adequate distribution
facilities.  As a result of this underfunding,  borrowers have sought other
sources  or have  made  piecemeal  and often  substandard  extensions  to their
distribution networks where most of the losses and bottlenecks occur.
Ironically, many  developing  country power  systems  suffer from unbalanced
Investments, with  overcapacity In  generation coexisting  with  serious
underinvestment  In distribution.-12-
Losses  and Service  Qualit
The  resuks  of the unbalanced  Investment  in sector  development
are reflected  In the high level  of technical  losses  which  until they recently
become  the focus  of systematic  Bank  attention  through  ESMAP,  had  been
addressed  through ad-hoc components  within traditional project loans.
High loss levels  drive up supply  costs  and lncrease  the sector's  financial
burden.  They are also Indicative  of  a poor quality of service since
substandard distribution networks which  lead  to  losses are  also
responsible  for voltage fluctuations  and power outages.  Poor quality
service  can have  a high economic  cost,  since  customers  will be obliged  to
retain some alternative  energy  source  or suffer a complete  disruption  of
their activities  during power  failures. Technical  losses  also have  a direct
economic  cost since a reduction  In losses  would,  at a minimum,  Improve
the quality  of service  and  possibly  permit  more  load  to be servsd  or delay
the expansion  of generation  and transmission  facilities.  In high loss
systems,  the outlays  required  to achieve  energy  savings  are  generally  very
much  less  than  the  cost  of Increasing  supply  capacity.
There are also considerable  non-technical  losses In electricity
system3.  These  occur  from  outright  theft  and  Inadequate  metering,  billing,
and  collection  - all of which  Indicate  poor  management,  weak  commercial
operatlons,  and lack of enforcement  or ability to disconnect  non-paying
users  of electricity. Taken  all together,  total losses  showed  no particular
trend  over  the last  decade,  Instead  but  showed  wide  variation  on  a regional
basis.  On  average,  total network  losses  were  13%,  while  a reasonable  norm
would  be less  than  8%.  By region,  loss  values  ranged  from  a low  of 11%  In
EMENA,  13%  In East  Asia,  15%  In LAC,  17%  In South  Asia,  to 21%  In both
East  and West  Africa.  More alarming  Is the finding that In most cases
where  losses  were over 10%  to begin wlth,  the situation  between  project
appraisal  and completlon  either remained  unchanged  or had worsened,
often despite remedial  action programs  and covenants  Included  within
proJects.-13-
Among a limited but fairly representative  sample of 26 utilities,
only 10 (or under 40%) evidenced good supply quality based on thelr
record of load shedding, sudden blackouts, brownouts, and voltage and
frequency fluctuations. Even more serious Is the finding that about  25%  of
these 26 power companies continued to have poor service quality after
over 10 years (at least three projects) of Bank Involvement  In the sector.
The loss levels also exhibited  quite similar characteristics.
Cost of Supplv  and Prices
The average cost of service based on such financial data as
operating costs shows little change during the study period, although
Inflation and exchange rate changes have made It  difficult  to  make
comparisons  across  countrles or over time. The economic costs are likely
to be higher because  assets have not been revalued In all cases and the
opportunity costs of resources  tend to be greater than the corresponding
market values (e.g., the  financial, rates  of  return  on  assets are  low
compared  with the opportunity  cost of capital).
In real terms, tariffs have not kept up with financial costs even In
financial terms.  The steady deterloration In the average operating ratio
over the past two decades  from 0.65 In the 1966-73  period to 0.80 during
1980-85,  provides supporting, but not necessarily conclusive, evidence.
Despite much emphasis by the  Bank on -economic  efficiency pricing,
relatively modest progress has been made  on a global basis except In the
cases of specific countries where marginal cost-based  tariff studies have
been partially or fully Implemented. A lack of data, however, prevents a
general  comparison  of tariffs with marginal  costs.-14-
PROJECT  PERFORMANCE
The performance  of projects can be measured  in terms of project
delays, costs, disbursements,  economic rates of return, demand forecasts,
and system losses.
Propect  Delays
The ability  of  utilities to  implement investment programs and
more specifically Bank-financed  projects according to schedule did not
improve during the 1970s and showed no clear trend in behavior.  For
projects approved between 1967 and 1978,  the average project duration
was about 46 months; however,  the actual average  Implementation  period
was 66 months, or 44%  longer than forecast. While some delays might be
due to  design changes, only 10% of projects were completed within 6
months of the implementation  schedule established at appraisal.  On a
Regional basis, EMENA,  LAC, and West Africa had time overruns of 51-
59%, while  East Asia,  and  East Africa  had  overruns  of  43% and  53%,
respectively. Insufficient data  were available  to give a reliable estimate for
South  Asia.
In the Regions there have been some variation In delays In the
1980s, but the overall mean  value has changed little.  Ongoing projects In
LAC have higher delays on average mostly because  of a lack of funds or
slowdown In demand. The average delay In completion In LAC was 18%
during the 1960s,  Increasing  to 52%  In the 1970s. West Africa has shown
some Improvement  and there has been an overall consistent  performance
In E.  Asia.
Prolect Costs
Project costs have shown a mixed pattern, depending In large
measure on the Bank's ability to make an adequate  provision for Inflation.-15-
For projects  approved In the  period  1967-78  and Implemented under
inflationary conditions,  the average  cost overrun was 19%  and only 40%  of
projects were within  +10% of the original estimate.  Projects approved
prior to 1974 had an average overrun of 49%  while those approved after
1974,  when sufficient price contingencles were provided, showed a cost
underrun. The trend continued In the 19808  as two thirds of the projects
had underruns  or were within + 10%  of the cost estimate. Underruns  have
continued In the 1980s as flerce competit;on among contractors drove
prices below estimates made on the basis of conditions prevailing before
the recession.
Disbursements
For 115 projects approved betv  een 1965 and 1979, the mean
disbursement  period was 69 months, or 3 months longer than the average
project duration. Most loans took 60-96  months  to disburse and  two thirds
took more than 72 months.  Only about  4%  of loans  took less than 3 years.
Throughout the disbursement  period, cumulative disbursements
lagged behind forecast, particularly In the early years.  During the 1970s
this delay appeared  to Increase,  with average disbursements  being only
26% of  the  forecast amount In the first  year.  Although the  average
disbursement  rose to 48%  In year two, it took about five years on average
before disbursements reached 90% of the forecast amount.  For long
projects, cumulative  disbursements  tended to remaln constant  at this level
until project completion  In years 8-10.
Further delays occurred In the 1980s.  A sample of  projects
implemented  during  this  period  shop  ed  an  Increasing  delay  In
disbursements  In the first four years.  Disbursements  In year 2 were 36%
compared with 48%  for the same perlod In the 1970s,  and In year 3 they
were 53%  compared  with 62%  In the previous decade.-16-
Economic  Rate  of Return  (ERR)
It Is difficult to ensure comparability with regard to the economic
rate of return of projects, because  the basis for estimating benefits has not
been consistent during the period under review. Earlier projects showed
the benefits  as being oetermined  by the avoided  costs of the next cheapest
alternative; nowadays  approach Is only used only to demonstrate  that a
particular project Is the least cost alternative. Various attempts have been
made to calculate consumer  surplus but the general  approach established
since the mid 1970's  has been  to use tarifs as the minimum estimate  of the
economic benefits.
Since SARs and audit reports use the same methodology to
calculate the ERR,  the ayerage ERR at appraisal and completion can be
reliably compared.  For projects approved between 1967 and 1982, the
average ERR estimated at eppraisal was 14.6% and was calculated at
c9mpletlon at  11.7%.  More projects (42%) had ERRs 3% lower than
forecast  while 21%  of projects had an ERR  3%  higher than forecast.
Demand  Forecasts
The shortfall In ERR  can be partlv attributed to over-optimism In
load forecasting.  During the  1970s there were no  serious  errors of
estimation, since the actual results at completion were only 6% less than
forecast. For projects  approved In 1978  and later, however,  there has been
a  tendency to  overestimate demand by  about 20%.  Thle  trend  has
continued Into the 1980s as a sample of twenty projects showed actual
sales 17%  less than forecast. In part, these  optimistic load  forecasts reflect
global energy price Increases  and recessionary  conditions  that were more
severe  than anticipated.
On  a  Regional basis, South Asia,  EMENA, and West Africa
showed particular over-optimism In demand forecasting, as actual sales
were 23%,  18%,  and 17%  less than forecast.-17-
System  Losses
Energy losses, defined as the difference between the physical
quantity sent out from the generators  and the amount metered and billed,
are probably  the single best physlcal Indicator  of utility performance. They
also provide a measure  of service quality, which Is Invariably poor where
technical losses are high.  Excessive  technical losses may be due to poor
network  design,  construction,  or maintenance.  Non-technical  losses reflect
theft and poor metering and billing by the utility.  Overall losses are the
sum of the two types of losses, and clearly reflect the general performance
of the utility and Its ability to construct  and operate  the system  according  to
an acceptable  standard,  as well as government  support for enforcement  of
sound utility commercial practices or legal penalties, where necessary.
For projects approved during 1967-1978,  30% of projects showed total
losses at completion greater  than 20%  of generation,  while 13%  of projects
had losses  greater  than 30%.
In the 1970s  and 1980s  greater  emphasis  has been  placed on Joss
reduction components In a number of  projects but there has been no
significant Improvement. Half of the utilities show the same loss level, and
40% had higher losses at completion than at appraisal. The average  loss
levels for projects approved In the 1970s were 21% for East and West
Africa, 17%  for South Asia, 15%  for LAC, 13%  for East Asia, and 11%  for
EMENA.
UTILITY  FINANCIAL  PERFORMANCE
The financial performance of the power sector as a whole has
shown considerable deterioratlon over the period starting before the first
oil crisis (1966-73),  between  the two oll shocks (1974-1979),  and from 1980
up to 1985. This trend Is based on a joint evaluation  of several financial
Indicators as well as the overall context, rather than changes  In Individual
Indices..18-
In each period,  poor performance can be traced to a shortfall  In
revenues, and to a lesser extent, an Increase In costs.  This situation  has
arisen  because  demand has generally  fallen  short  of the  forecast  level,
tariffs  (price/kWh)  have been  less than  required,  and  losses have been
greater than forecast.  There Is little evidence In the year-to-year behavior
of these  ratios  to  suggest  that  the  oil  crises  of 1973 and  1979 gave an
unusual  shock  to  the  overall  trend.  Little  change  In  the  general
deterioration  Is evident, although the oil crises undoubtedly worsened the
downward trend (even If It did not cause a step change).
The  performance  of  Individual  projects  from  appraisal  to
aompletion  contributes  to the overall trend of the sector.  This performance
can  be  observed  by  looking  at some  o;  the  key  utility  financial  ratios,
discussed below.
Operating Ratio
The  operating  ratio  (defined  as  operating  costs  before  debt
service,  depreciation  and  other  financing  charges,  divided  by  operating
revenues), Is one of the few ratios for which a higher value could Indicate
deterioration  In financial  performance.  However, the Interpretation  of this
ratio  should  be  related  to  generation  mix  and  utility  size.  The  average
operating  ratio  for  97  observations  was  0.68  In  the  period  1966-73,
deteriorated to 0.73 during 1974-1979,  and further to 0.80 between 1980 and
1985.  The  average  for  the  entire  period  was  0.74,  taken  from  259
observations.  Over  the  project  Implementation  period,  two  thirds  of
projects  approved  In the 1970s showed a 5% or greater  Increase In the
operating ratio and 30% of projects had a 20% or greater increase over the
forecast  at the time  of appraisal.  Only 9% of projects  showed operating
ratios  which  were  lower than  forecast, again  reflecting  the  tendency  for
over-optimism.  Bank staff  recognized the  Impact of the oil crises In part
using  less ambitious  estimated values In making forecasts after 1973 and
1979. Projects Implemented In the 1980s showed similar results.-19-
During the course of project Implementation, there was no change
In  the  operating  ratlo  for  40% of  projects,  while  one  third  showed  a
deterioration. Of the 28% of projects with a poor operating ratio at appraisal
(greater than 0.80), three quarters did not lead to Improvements or showed
further deterioration In that ratio, over time.
Rate ot  Return on Assets
During the 1950S  and 1960s, more projects achieved the targeted
rates of return than In the 19709 and 19809.  Rates of return started at an
average of 9.2% from 1966-1973, dropping  to 7.9% from 1974-79, and then
declining to 6.0% In 1980-85. The average for 220 observatlons was 7.9%,
indicating  that  the decline  has been uniform  and  steady throughout  the
entire  period  since  1966.  This  trend  Is  only  partly  explained  by  the
Increasing  use of revalued assets In computing  the rate of return during
recent years.
Over the  past  two  decades there  also  has been an  Increasing
deviation  between  the  forecast  and  actual  rates  of  return  at  project
completion.  For projects  approved between 1968-78, on average 18% of
projects met the rate of return forecast, 26%  were higher than forecast, and
55% were lower.  Of the 55%, 43% were below the target by 3 percentage
points  or  more.  On  average there  was  llttle  change  In  rate  of  return
between project appraisal and completion.
Self Financing Ratio
The  calculation  of  self-financing  ratio  (SFR)  has  been  very
Inconsistent In appraisal and audit reports, despite very specific guidelines
for this  computation  In OMS 2.22, and the  Increasing use of this  ratio to
establish  revenue  covenants  with  Borrowers.  At  the  same  time,
comparability  of the SFR  across utilities  Is complicated by the sensitivity  of
the estimation formula to the financlal system of the utility.  Many appraisal-20-
reports do not allow for changes  in working capital In the calculation of the
self-financing  ratio and, as a result,  this ratio Is overstated. In many  cases,
the self-financing ratio would be negative If the ratio had been correctly
calculated and nn average  would be about one quarter less than the ratio
estimated In the SAR.
All  self-financing ratios have been recalculated In accordance
with OMS 2.2.  Within their limited applicability, the resuls  show that the
forecasting  error was In fact high. About 31%  of projects had self-financing
ratios more than 20 percentage  points lower than forecast at ccmpletion.
The forecasting error has tended to  increase during the 1970s and has
shown continued deterioration In the  1980$ as a  result of  both  over-
optimism and poor performance  by the Borrowers. At the same  time, the
actual values of the self-financing ratio have also worsened over time,
starting at an average  of 25%  in 1966-73  but falling to 17%  by 1980-85.
During the 19509  and 1960s,  an OED  study reported that the self-
financing  ratio  Improved on  average during  the  course  of  project
implementation;  however,  for projects approved  during the period 1968483,
there was an average deterioration of 6 percentage  points during project
Implementation.  This tendency  Is  particularly problematic since  the
financing  of  both  the  project  and  the  sector  Investment program Is
generally expected to  be  supported  by  an  Increasing percentage of
Intemally generated  funds. This objective Is sought not only In connection
with economic pricing and to ensure basic financial  soundness  of the utility
but also as part of the overall macroeconomic  objective of using the power
tariff to mobilize resources  for one of the most capital Intensive  sectors In
any country.
Debt Service  Coveraae  Ratio
The debt  service ratio for one third  of  projects did  not meet
appraisal forecests and, of these projects, one half were 100 percentage
points lower than forecast.  The average debt service coverage ratio was-21  -
1.8 for the entire 1966-6S  period.  us ratio showed a decline, dropping
from an average  of 2.0  during 1966-73  to 1.6 In the 1980-85  period.
The performance  of projects Implemented  In the 1980s  was not
significantly different from that of  projects Implemented In the  19708.
About one quarter of projects showed no Improvement  In the debt service
ratio and 40%  stayed about constant  during the project period.  Moreover,
of the 50%  of all projects  which had a modest poor debt service ratio (less
than 2.0) at  appraisal, half showed no Improvement while one quarter
showed  further deterioration.
Days  Recelvable
This ratio Is a good Indicator of the efficiency of the commerclal
operations  of a utility as it reflects Its capabiltiy with regard  to collection of
bills,  as wel!  as, In some cases, the ability  to  disconnect delinquent
customers.  The  general Bank target  Is  about 60  days of  accounts
receivable. Actual days receivable  Increased  from 77 days during 1966-73
to 108 In the 19708,  and to 112 days In the 1980-85  period. The overall
average  was 96 days.
Seventy  seven percent of projects did not meet the forecast, and
three quarters of these showed recelvables Increasing by 20 days more
than  forecast.  During the  course  of  Implementation, there  was  an
Improvement for 30% of  projects, while for  another 30% there was a
deterioration,  generally  by more  than 20 days.
Conformity  with Covenants
On average,  there were approximately  seven (financial and non-
financial) covenants  per project during 1968-83.  Conformity  with covenants
was achieved In about 38%  of cases and about  33%  more were considered
to have had fair compliance. The remaining  covenants  were considered  as-22 -
being In default with poor or no compliance. However,  these results may
provide a  misleading picture.  As described eariler, performance was
particularly weak with respect to the more important financial covenants,
especially rate of return and days receivable. Compliance was achieved
most frequently with soft covenants  that typically required the carrying out
of a study or consultation  with the Bank on particular  Issues.
Institutional Indicators  >
Institutional performance  over  the past two decades  was reviewed
based on Indicators such as the number of consumers per employee,
adequacy of maintenance,  and general utility efficiency.  These indicators
showed  that  Institutional  performance has  stagnated at  a  relatively
unsatisfactory  level over  the period.
1.3 Conclusion and Recommendations
The  findings  above clearly  Indicate that  performance during
project  Implementation and for the power sector overall has shown a
steady decline over  the past few decades. The  Bank In part has allowed for
poorer  performance by  reducing the  financial targets, Increasing the
contingencies In cost estimates, and reducing demand forecasts.  These
allowances have not been sufficient and the forecasts In many cases still
may be considered  unrealistic.
More alarming trom the Bank's longer-term perspective Is the
deteriorating trend over time.  This Is because  the foundation for sound
power sector performance  In the last decade  could most easily have been
laid  through  earlier  lending,  when the  Bank's contribution to  overall
national power Investments  was relatively high.  The present and future
ability of  the Bank to  induce favorable changes In developing country
power utilities through traditlohal project lending Is a continuing cause  for
concem, as the Bank's  shRre  Of  total sectoral  Investment  declines.-23-
The present situation Is not sustainable In the  long run and
continued sector growth In many countries will hasten the deterioration
rather than lead to Improvements. Unless  there Is an Improvement  In the
quality  of  service to  accompany the  expansion of  service to  new
customers,  there will be Increasing  difficulties In persuading  customers  to
pay higher tariffs.  Governments  are very sensitive to the objections of
customers, generally the politically influentlal urban minorities, who resist
paying  higher  prices  for  poor  service  which  shows  little  sign  of
Improvement. The consequences  of this vicious cycle are equally clear.
Poor service leads  to low revenues  which leads  to !nsufficlent  Internal  cash
generation  and underfuiding of all activities, which means  poorer service
and a greater reluctance  to raise tariffs. To further aggravate  the situation,
funds available from Government  are used to  support expansion rather
than maintenance  or rehabilitation.
Not only Is there the negative financial Impact of poor project
performance but  also  the  negative  economic  !mpact  of  continued
deterioration In the  power sector.  TeahnIcal, financial and managerial
inefficiencies result  In  misallocation of  scarce resources.  There are
significant economic losses due to  poor quality of service and power
outages which In most cases exceed  the cost of relatively straightforward
remedial measuros.  Finally, the Increasing debt burden of the  power
sector that must be borne by the economy at large, gre  atly Increases  the
Importance  of broad power-energy-macroeconomic  analysis. The ability of
the Bank to Influence policy In developing countries will therefore  depend
more and more on the skill and credibility with which staff are able to deal
with complex Issues,  especially within the context  of policy based lending.
Conditionality  In  project  or  policy  based  lending  may  Increase the
probability of success, but it Is clear that without the active cooperation  and
conviction of governments,  there will be little change  In the trend of project
performance.
The foregoing discussion argues In favor  of  putting  greater
emphasis on efficiency and restructuring Issues rather than concentrating
on expansion.  Greater emphasis needs to  be given to  Improving the-24 -
quality  of  service  and  reducing  losses  through  rehabilitation  and
reinforcement  of power systems. Given the present state of many power
utilities,  It  may not  be possible to  achieve rehabilitation and service
Improvements simultaneously with  system expansion.  Furthermore, In
many countries there Is a large backlog of maintenance  requirements In
addition to the need to Improve operations. These needs already place a
burden on Institutions  which do not have sufficient qualified manpower  to
meet the  requirements for  both  expanding the  system and operating
existing systems.
If system maintenance,  rehabilitation, and expansion cannot be
sustained according to  normal demand growth rates, priorities for the
extension of new services will have to be set, particularly If govemments
are not willing to  use price as a tool In managing demand.  Emphasis
shr.;.dd  be placed on serving productive sectors, notably Industry and
agricvlture when economically justified.  This approach may well lead to
less rural electrification and a slower expansion of supply to  domestic
customers  than would otherwise  be planned  by governments  and utilities.
The  Bank's normal criteria for  project selection would place
greater emphasis  on Improving  service  quality than on expansion  since the
rate of return for rehabilitation  projects generally  will be much higher than
fur expansion (given the poor state of many power systems today).  The
lower unit cost of supply achieved through loss reduction or Improved
availability ot existing equipment would1  be part of the least cost solution
and should be fully exploited before adding more facilltles.  Expa iding
service at a time when service quality Is poor and deteriorating  could lead
to a reduced economic rate of return since existing and new customers
might suffer Increased  power  outages  which have  high economic costs.
There Is a fundamental  need to set more realistic targets.  The
record suggests that targets have been set to justify projects wlti  little
chance  that the objectives will be met.  If It Is apparent  that projects  would
not be justified under the assumption  of more realistic forecasts,  then there
Is a further argument  for more intensification of existing servlic since this-25-
could  Improve the  overall financial  performance as well  as the economic
rate of return of proJects.
We have noted earlier,  the need to pay greater  attention to the
treatment of uncertainty, and scenario-oriented approaches.  As part of the
forecasting  exercise,  it  Is advisable to  make greater use of risk  analysis
particularly  In  connection  with  financial  projections.  Until  recently,
sensitivity  analysis  was  done  only  In  connection  with  the  economic
evaluation but no discussion was required (in the SAR financial analysis) of
the Impact on project and program financing should revenues be less than
forecast or  If capital  costs  for the program as a whole were significantly
greater than estimated.  However, Bank policy now requires discussion  of
sensitivity to changes In the market, etc. (OPN  2.02).
The study  has also revealed the need for more consideration  of
projects In a sectoral context.  Project audits have by and large concluded
that  projects  have  been  justified  and  for  the  most  part  have  been
successful In meeting objectives.  Taken as a longer-term trend, however, It
Is clear that  the  power sector  has been In a state of continuous  decline
despite remaining probably the best performlrng  of all sectors supported by
the Bank.  It Is recommended, therefore, that PCRs and PPARs look more
broadly  at  sector  performance  and  assess  overall  performance  over  a
longer time  span than the project period.  The project should be revlewed
In the light of total sector performance and Its prospects for the future.  The
justification  of projects depends In large measure on sustaining the sector
over the physical life of the assets. For many utilities, this Is a questionable
prospect given the performance over the past two decades.
Specific  recommendations  for  Improving  project  and  sector
performance are summarized as follows:
1.  systematically  examine  options  for  sector  restructuring,  In order  to
strengthen market forces, Improve the environment In which the utility
functions, and Increase incentives for enhanced utility efficiency;-26-
2.  place  greater  emphasis  on  Improving  productive  efficiency,  wlth
special  reference  to  maintenance,  rehabilitation,  and  distribution
network  Investments,  In order  to  Improve  losses  and  the  quality  of
service:  measuring  productive  efficiency  can  only  be  achieved by
developing  more  systematic  collection  and  analysis  of performance
Indicators;
3.  strengthen the analysis of power-energy-macroeconomic linkages, and
pay more  attention to  project  evaluation In the sectoral  and  national
economic  context.  In particular,  assess the feasibillty  of the  sector
Investment program  and the  ability  of the  sector  and government to
finance the program;
4.  in determining  Investment and pricing policy, adopt  less deterministic
analytical  approaches that  can better account for the uncertainties  In
the  current  environment.  Also  carry  out  a  more  In-depth  risk  and
sensitivity  analysis  of  the  Impact  of  poor  project  and  sector
performance  In the form of "what If" questions, as part of the financial
evaluation to be undertaken during project  preparation and as part of
sector work (rather than at appraisal);
S.  ensure  that  sufficient  Investment  planning  has  been  carried  out  to
assess  the  relative  Importance  of  rehabilitation  and  reinforcement
compared  with  generation  and  transmission  capacity  expansion.
Maintain a balance In lending to ensure that all parts of the system can
be uniformly develooed;
6.  adopt  more  realistic  targets  with  respect  to  physical  and  especially
financial  performance,  and Identity more clearly  and specifically  the
constraints to meeting such targets.
The current study has some Implications for the manner In which
the  Bank conducts  its own affairs.  Clearly, the  capability  for  continued
analysis  and  policy  development,  as  well  as  the  Institutional  memory,
needs  to  be  strengths-.ed.  This  study  Indicates  significant  scope  for-27-
improving  the  organization,  presentation,  consistency,  and  general
accessibility of project data. Availability  of the relevant  historical data on a
consistent format cross different projects, and over reasonable  periods of
time, would enable statistical analysis at a much more sophisticated level
than has been possible In this study.  This Is highly desirable, since the
Bank would then be In a position to  better understand the underlying
causal factors  that  Influence pro;3ct and  utility  performance.  Such
Information would be Invaluable In designing loan covenants, arresting
adverse trends at a much earlier stage In the project cycle, and predicting
power  project and utility performance.  While most  of the useful Information
on past and current lending  may be ultimately  retrievable,  the efort Is likely
to  be prohibitively cnstly.  Therefore, It Is recommended  that while the
comprehensive  database compiled for this  study be further developed,
regularly updated, and made readily accessible to  other Bank staff, a
serious eftort be made to also collect and preserve all relevant data, for
current and future power  sector projects.
Beyond  the data collection and organization  level, there Is a need
to build up and maintain  a critical mass  of staff who can provide Intellectual
leadership  and proactive  guidance, by analyzing  past Information,  drawing
useful lessons for the future, and developing new and viable policies for
future operations.  This problem Is compilcated by the tendency for the
deep insights and knowledge that has been acquired by senior staff to
vanish with  their  retirement.  At  the  same time,  daily  pressures on
operational staff act as a deterrent to those who wish to synthesize  and
preserve some of their valuable experience for the benefit of colleagues.
The  strengthening of  the policy  development capability Is  particularly
Important,  given  that  Bank  lending  Is  presently  carrled  out  In  an
environment  of rapid change  and many  relatively  Inexperienced  operational
staff are being called upon to address more and more complex Issues,
often under severe  time and resource  constraints.
Beyond  the database  development  mentioned  above,  It would be
useful to develop an agendr. ut more in-depth follow-up Bank studies In
areas  such as:-28-
'4.  Investment planning  under  uncertain  conditions  - Identify  and
strengthen  analytical tools  and  approaches to  determine  robust
investment  policy decisions In changing  external  circumstances.
2.  Integrated national energy planning and policy analysis - strengthen
available analytical tools  and practical methodology to  study  key
subsector-sector-macroeconor,nic  links and determine  energy strategy,
and later apply this approach In selected case studies Involving both
project and policy based  lending.
3.  Energy-environmental  analysis - develop  framework  for energy sector
policy In relation to environmental  and natural resource management
based  on sound economic  principles.
4.  Critical review of the Bank's power lending experience over several
decades  In selected  countries.
5.  Causal links  between the  external environment of  energy sector
Institutions  and  their performance.
6.  Identification of specific reasons for declining utility performance  and
their relative  Importance.
7.  Planned  versus  actual  Investment  programs  and  reasons  for
differences.
8.  Comparison  of marginal  costs of supply and prices.-29-
11.  POWER  PROJECT  AND  SECTOR  PERFORMANCE
2.1  Introduction
A retrospective study of the power sector has been carried out
covering projects financed by the World Bank and IDA between  1965  and
1983. Altogether, the study covered about 300 projects, of which about
85%  were completed by the end of 1986. While a few aspects of power
project  performance  have  been  reviewed  from  time  to  time,  no
comprehensive  study of Bank-financed  power projects  covering the last 20
years  had previously been undertaken.  However, a  large sample of
projects Implemented  between  195i and 1968  was Included In a review of
the power sector by OED In 1972.  Therefore, a limited review of project
and sector performance over the past 30 years has been made possible
with the additional data collected for this retrospective  study. The source
of the data collected has been mostly limited to appraisal  and audit reports
and exlsting studies carried out by EGY  over the past few years. Details of
the source  of data  and how It was analyzed  are Included  In Annex 1.
Throughout the  1950s and 1960s, power sector  lending was
primarily  confined to  countries In  Latin America, Asia  and European
countries, plus a few major hydroelectric projects In smaller countries.
Several of these countries have since graduated  from Bank lending (for
example, Ireland and Slngapore),  while others have continued to borrow
funds for the power  sector from the Bank (or IDA)  almost  continuously  over
the past thirty years (for example, Brazil, Colombia, India, Paklstan and
Turkey). During  the 19708  and 1980s,  the number  of countries borrowing  to
finance power projects Increased  significantly and there still continues to
be new lower-Income  countries borrowing  from the Bank or IDA  for the first
time for the power sector (Burma and Burundi).  Over the time perlod
covered In this  retrospective study, 1965-1983,  about 33% of  projects
approved  were for Latin  America,  20%  for the EMENA  regions, 17%  for East
1/ "Power  Sector  Review",  Operatlons  Evaluation  Department  (OED),  1972-30-
Asia,  12% for  South Asia, and 9% and 8% for  East and West Africa
respectively.  The  loan  and  credit  amounts  were  distributed  In
approximately  the same percentages  as the number of loans except that
West Africa received 4%  and East  Asia about  22%  of total Bank/IDA  lending.
The principal objectives  of this study are:
(I)  to assess power sector performance  In terms of the Increase In
availability and access  to service,  quality and cost of supply, and
price.
(11)  to assess power project performance  In terms of key Indicators
relating  to  physical  Implementation and to  Institutional and
financial performance  and adherence  to loan covenants;
(111)  to Identity causal factors which explaln the reasons for good or
poor performance;  and
(iv)  to  identity options and make recommendations,  for Improving
project and sector performance.
The available data were analyzed  to determine If there were any
common patterns over time In the performance  of projects and the sector
or whether there were strong reglonal differences.  The results of the
analysis  of  the  data  do  not  by  themselves Indicate whether  poor
performance was  due  to  (1) an  over  optimistic  forecast  of  project
performance; (11)  the Borrower failing to Implement  measures  that would
have  Improved  project Implementation;  or (111)  external  factors  that militated
against successhfl Implementation of  the  project  These points  are
discussed  In more detail In the next chapter.
2.2 Access.  Quality and Cost of Service,  and Price
An Initial objective of this retrospective study Is to look at the
sector from the point of view of the consumer.  Therefore, data were
analyzed  to determine whether or not people In L.DC's  are better off than
they were before 1965  In terms of access, quality and cost of service, and
price paid.-31 -
Avallabillty  and Access  to Electricity
Thirty years ago, the supply of electric power In most developing
countrles was confined to owie  or two large citles and the major source of
power was small thermal plants.  During the past thirty years, however,
growth of the sector has been very high and now most major towns and
many  smaller towns have  been supplied with electricity from an Integrated
network using various kinds of power plants operated  and developed  as a
system. Some  countries now serve  much of the urban population and have
embarked  on ambitious  rural electrificatlon  programs.
Installed capacity Increased  by 9.7%  p.a. between  1968  and 1982
compared  to 10.6%  p.a. In the 1950s  and 19609. Power  generation  showed
similar growth of 9.6% p.a. between  1968  and 1982,  and 11.3%  p.a. In the
1950s  and 19609. Growth In the power sector has easily exceeded  that of
real GDP In most countries and also has been far higher than population
growth rates, Indicating  that overall access  to electricity service has been
Increaslnu.
Access  to  service can  be  measured by  several  Indicators,
Including  (I) generation  per capita,  which Indicates  the amount  of electricity
per capita produced; (II) Insta:led  capacity per capita; and (III) percent of
the population actually connected  to the public grid.  Data  for 51 countries
In 1968  and 1982  showed  that, on average,  generation  per capita Increased
by 7% p.a. and Installed capacity by nearly 8% p.a.  These growth rates
compare  very favorably with an average  real growth rate of nearly 2% p.a.
for per capita  GDP  over  the same  time period. In over 90%  of countries,  per
capita generation and Installed capacity growth rates were more than
double the real growth rate for GDP and In 57% of countrles more than
three  times as high.
Eariler  data on the percentage  of the populatlon having  electricity
connectlons were not readlly available, but data for just  a sample of
projects showed an average growth rate of 9% a year In connectlons -
about  two and a half times the population  growth rate. For most countrles,32 -
the growth rate of connections was higher than the rate of growth of real
GDP per capita.  Indeed, even In those countries  where there was little or
negative growth over the period,  most of the countries  experienced more
than a 5% annual growvth  In generation and more than a 3% annual growth
in connections-
Quality of Service and Losses
Quality of service  did not become a particular  Issue In the Bank
until the late 1970s when the economic colt  of power outages and the cost
of losses became increasingly  important.  Before then, losses were dealt
with  as  a relatively  minor  aspect  In prolects.  The  Institution  of ESMAP,
however, focussed specific attention on the reduction of both technical and
non-technical  losses.  The level of technical  losses can serve as a proxy
measure for  the  quality  of service  which  can  be  described  In terms  of
frequency and duration of outages and voltage and frequency changes.  Of
course,  some  technical  losses  are  unavoidable  because  of  the
characteristics  of the power system.  Generally, 6-8% In transmission and
distribution  losses as a fraction  of gross generation Is regarded as a good
target.  Station use at the generators might normally  Increase losses by a
further  1-7%,  depending  on  the  type  of  power  plant,  ranging  from
hydroelectric  to coal-fired thermal.
Losses over and above the "nofmal"  level for an efficient  utility
result from technical and non-technical causes.  High technical  losses are
systemic and are a function of overloading.  They are symptomatic of poor
power network design, construction, and maintenance, all of which lead to
a poor  service  quality.  Inadequate generating  facilitles  leading  to  load
shedding,  particularly  at the time of peak load, will  further compound  the
2/  M.  Munasinghe,  The  Economics  of  Power  Svstem  Rellability  and
Planning,  Johns  Hopkins  Univ.  Press, Baltimore,  MD, 1979;  and  M.
Munasinighe and W.G. Scott, Eneraiv Efficlency: Oatimization of Electric
Power Distribution  System  Losses, Energy  Department  Paper No. 6,
1982.-33  -
problem  ot poor service quality  quite apart from problems  caused by the
distribution  network.  Non-technical causes Include the failure of the utility
to meter and/or bill  consumers and failure to control  Illegal connections.
The  latter,  of  course,  only  adds  to  the  problem  of  overloading  of  the
distribution  network.
Except for specific  studies for some countries, very few projects
approved  In the 1980s  assigned  an  overall  rating  of service  quality  to each
utility  (on a one-to-five good-to-poor scale).  The results Indicated that 11
out of 26 utilities  had a poor to very  poor quality  of service, taking  Into
account  brownouts,  blackouts,  voltage  fluctuations,  and  systematic  load
shedding, while  ten utilities  provided a good quality  of service.  Of the 11
utilities  with  poor service,  six were on at least their  third  Bank-financed
power project which means that the Bank had been Involved with them for
at least ten  years,  and  In some  cases, more than  fifteen  years.  Similar
findings were obtained for levels of total losses.
For the most part, the available data could not discern  technical
losses  as  a  percentage  of  total  losses.  A  review  of  available  ESMAP
reports on loss reduction studies reveals a wide range of technical losses,
as follows.
Technical a/  Non-technical  b/  Total
Losses %  Loss %  Losses %
Sri  Lanka  14  4  18
Panama  17  5  22
Sudan  17  14  31
Bangladesh  14  17  31
Liberia  c/  13  22  35
Malaysia (Sabah State)  11  17  28
Ivory Coast  8  4  12
a/  Technical energy loss as a percentage of net generation.
b/  On  a  base  of  net  generation  due  to  metering  and  biling
errors, theft, and Illegal connections.
c/  Increased during period 1982-1985.
3/  "Power Sector Performance Review", Energy Department, 1986.-34-
The small sample  size makes It difficult to draw firm conclusions;
howaver, It would appear from these results and general experience  that a
poor quality of service Is both a symptom and a cause of poor power
project and sector performance. Where  the utility Is weak, for example,  In
Sudan, Bangladesh  and Liberia, commercial operations and distribution
Investment and maintenance  lag behind demand causing a rise In both
non-technical  and  technical losses. As service quality deteriorates,  there Is
a greater tendency for customers  to avoid paying for bad service which In
tum reduces funds avallable  to maintain  and Improve  the network. For  this
reason It Is reasonable  to use total losses as an Indicator of quality of
service.
Data  available  for projects Implemented  between  the late 1960s  to
and  1980s Indicated that  there  does  not  appear to  have been  any
Improvement  In the level of losses over time. The weighted (by amount of
generation) average  losses as a percent of reported generation  were 13%,
with a median value at 12.5% for projects approved between 1967-78.
Losses  at this level would normally be reasonable  for a utility Involved In
distribution activities, but It was often ambiguous as to whether the loss
.lgure Included  station use or not. It appears  that many  of the figures given
iave not Included station use so that total losses could be In the 16-18%
range.  Regardless  of the definition used  to determine  losses,  about 30%  of
cases showed losses greater than 20%,  which Is definiteily  excessive;  In
13%  of cases, losses exceeded  30%. Data  for projects Implemented  In the
19806 Indicates an average level of losses of  17%, with about 36% of
utilities having  losses higher than 20%.
Despite greater emphasis placed by the Bank on loss reduction
programs In recent years, it appears  that, on everage,  there has been little
Improvement In the  level of  losses during project  Implementation (an
average  of 5.5  years). Ne4rly  half of the utilities  had  the same  losses  at
project  completlon  as at a*  pralsal,  and about  30%  had  Jower  losses. Of
those utilities with losses  above  10%  at appraisal,  40%  had even higher
losses than forecast at project completion  and 26% were lower than
forecast.  The two Africa reglons had the highest loss levels of 21%,-35.
followed by South Asi  with 17%, LAC  with 15%, East Asia with 13%,  and
EMENA  with 10.5%.
Other Indicators of  service quality are either not available or
require further analysis  before  any conclusions  can be drawn. The need  for
load  shedding because of  Insufficient generating capacity cannot be
Inferred  directly frT  the available  data, for example,  on the basis of
system load factor or the ratio of peak demand  to Installed  capacity. Load
factors could Increase  either due to load shedding or changes In demand
characteristics.  The ratio  of  peak cemand  to  Installed capacity Is an
Indicator of the level of reserve  margin available  and therefore  the ability to
meet peak demand  with allowance  for both scheduled  and forced outages.
The peak demand  to total Installed capacity ratio was analyzed  using the
PPAR  basic data  sheets and was found to lie In the range of 40-100%  at the
time  of  project appraisal.  For utilities at the high end of the  range,
generation additlons were clearly required.  For utilities with an Implied
reserve margin of around 50%, i  cannot be concluded Immediately that
there  is  excess generating capacity because of  the varying technical
characterlstics of  the  systems.  In  countries where  maintenance Is
Inadequate due to  lack of skilled  staff and available spares, a  higher
reserve margin would be required to achieve  a reasonable  level of service
as measured  by Loss of Load  Probability  (LOLP).
The Qptimum  level of LOLP  will depend on the economic cost of
outages such that more Industrialized countries In EMENA, LAC, and
increasingly In East  Asia Regions  would require a lower LOLP  and, hence,
higher reserve margin. The optimal reserve margin requirement  13  also a
function of the nature of the sys!em, Its mix of plant, the seasonal firm
power available In hydro based and mixed systems, and the extent of
derating of older thermal plants.  In short, the optimal reserve margin
requirement  varies depending on circumstance,  so that the maxlmum  peak
demand  to Installed  capacity  figure would show significant  variation before
taking Into consideration other factors such as lumpiness  of Investment,
the point In the planning cycle such as just before (or after) starting (or
completing) a large generating  plant, the utility's capacity  to carry out the-36-
planned Investment  program,  and the ability to forecast peak demand. It Is
not  surprising,  therefore,  that  no  trend  Is  evident  In  the  peak
demand/installed  capacity  ratios.
Using overall losses, then, as the sole Indicator of quality of
service, no significant trend over time can be ;n7frred with regard to the
quality of service. For the period 1965-1986,  It Is concluded that there was
no  overall  Improvement  In  service  quality  during  the  project
Implementation  perlod while for about 30% some Improvement  occurred
and for the remaining 20%  of projects an overall deterioration Is assumed
to have  occurred.
=:ost  of SUDDIy  and Price
Various approaches were used In the course of this study to
letermine the trend of the cost per kWh of electricity over time.  Data
llmitatlons In terms of the number of valid observations  that were avallable
were such that no firm conclusions could be drawn from the cost figures
themselves. The wide fluctuations In Inflatlon rates and Inconsistencies  In
exchange rates (which complicated the conversion of costs to a base of
constant US dollars) made a comparison among countries and over time
unrealistic.
Further  attempts  were  made  using  national  consumer and
wholesale  price Indlces to obtain a ratio of costkWh at completion to the
cost/kWh at appraisal In local currency for each country. Since economic
costs were not generally available,  financial operating costs were used In
thelr place. From the very limited data available  for operating  costs at the
beginning and end of projects, i  would appear  that nineteen utilities had
lower cost/Wh  at project completion than at appraisal In real terms and
eight had hlgher costs (using the wholesale price Index as a deflator).
These very limited results suggest that over the project Implementatlon
period (6.5  years on average)  the financial cost of power declined by about
14% In  real terms.  Several points would modify  such a  conclusion,
however:-37-
(I)  assets  were  not  properly  revalued  by  utilitles  In  many  cases
following  currency  devaluations and  In  line with  local  Inflation;
thus, average costs at completlon are understated;
(II)  depreciation  rates  allowed  by  governments  often  are
unreallstically  low; therefore,  capital  costs  are  understated  and
the  weight  of  capital  cost  In the total  cost of electricity  Is also
understated; and
(lil)  fuel cost Increases In many countries were not fully passed on to
power utilities  In line with International markets (neither have fuel
prices been reduced In many cases when Internal prices fell).
On the oiher hand, pronounced economies of scale are evident In
some countries  (Bangladesh, for example, where growth has been a rapid
12-15% p.a.) and  generating  units  and  transmisslon  voltage  levels  have
now reached the  level where  economies of scale  are most  pronounced.
Because  of  rapid  growth,  the  Increasing  percentage  of  recent  plant
additions at lower unit cost Is now being reflected In the annual operating
costs.
Available data on operating ratios (the ratio of operating  costs to
operating revenues), given In Sectlon 2.7, Indicates that revenues have not
kept  up  with  costs  during  the  1970s and  1980s.  The  overall  trend  In
operating  ratio  shows  an Increase on average of about  one  percentage
point  a year.  This finding  Is borne out by data from a limited  number of
projects which Indicate that,  tariffs In real terms decreased over the project
period  by  an  average  of  12% (using  the  wholesale  price  Index  as  a
deflator).  Average tariffs  had decreased for 60% of utilities and Increased
for  only  25%.  In most  countries,  tariffs  also declined  compared to  the
average cost of living  (using the consumer price Index as a defletor)  until
the late 1970s, when It appears that tariffs started to Increase more than the
consumer price Index.  However, more data Is required before this finding
can be verified.-38-
'2.3 Prolect  Composition
In countries where a  large percentage of the total  population
remains unserved, the growth In satisfied demand rOses  directly with the
increase In supply.  The constraining factor on the growth of the sector
then  becomes the  sustainable rate  of  Investment and of  Institutional
development.  These limitations to sector growth have been evident in
countries such as Bangladesh,  Sudan,  and Nigeria (at least while the oil
boom was under way). Because  of the supply constraint  there Is a need  to
maintain  a  balance  In  Investments in  generation, transmission, and
distribution facilities; otherwise service quality will deteriorate as one or
other component  becomes  overloaded.
For projects approved  during the 1960  and 19709,  80-65%  of total
disbursements  were primarily for generation  and the remaining  percentage
for transmission and distribution. There has been a slight shift during the
1980s with generation comprising the major component of about 55% of
projects.  Nearly half of the projects in the 19508  and 19608  contained
hydro components (according to the OED report) but this share dropped
during the 1970s and 19806  to about 25430%. The proportion of hydro
components appears to have declined even further during the last two
years,  1985  - 1986.
The above project composition suggests that the Bank has not
sufficiently supported the Investment requirements for distribution since
typically 30% of total assets should be for distribution facilities to ensure
balanced system Investment.  This mix, however, reflects the  Bank's
traditional role as the financier of projects which must be completed en
bloc (such as hydro and large  thermal plants  and major  transmission  lines),
rather than the financier of distribution facilities (which can be executed  as
a  continuous series of  small  projects).  Such small projects can  be
financed  with modest amounts  of funding  from bilaterals, suppliers  credits,
and the utilities' own resources. This approach has helped to ensure that
the large projects have been adequately  funded and have generally been
well executed; however, it Is evident from the poor performance  on loss-39-
reduction and the need tor specifkc  ioss reduction programs  that there has
been a general underfunding  of distribution networks  with a corresponding
poor  quality  of  service.  Given the  high  economic  cost  of  power
Interruptions  associated  with. distribution faults, there Is a strong argument
In favor of Increasing the Bank's Involvement  for lending for distributlon
components and bringing the compositlon of  lending Into line with the
composition  of overall Investment  requirements.
The Regional  share of projects changed quite dramatically from
the periods 1950-65  to 1966-83  when many new countries borrowed  for the
first time from the Bank for power projects.  Latin America had received
nearly two thirds of the loans between  1950-65  (many of which were for
Brazil, Mexico and Colombia)  but the region's share dropped to about one
third from 1966-83.
2.4 Prolect Imolementatlon
The performance  of projects  was analyzed  to assess  the extent of
project  delays and cost  overruns or  underruns, and the rate  of  loan
disbursements.
Prolect  Delavs
One of  the principal measures at  project performance Is the
degree to which the project was Implemented  as planned. For the sample
of 50 projects Implemented  from 1967482,  only about 60%  were completed
as  agreed at  appraisal.  However, In  most  cases transmission and
distribution components  were changed  since these components  could not
be precisely defined at the time of appraisal. No clear pattem of revisions
emerges, for  as many transmission and distribution components were
expanded as  were  i.aly partially  completed In  comparison with  the
originally agreed  programs.
Adherence  to the project Implementation  schedule  Is the second
key measure of  project performance.  This also can be an Important.40 -
Indicator of the efficlency of the Borrower,  although  external  circumstances
outside of the control of the utility do account  for many  delays (see  Chapter
ll.).  On average,  projects approved  between  1967-1978  were estimated  at
appraisal to be completed In 46 months but actual Implementation  time
amounted to 66 months - an average  delay of 20 months. About 10%  of
projects were completed over an exceptionally  long Implementation  period
of 90-114  months (Figure 1).  Excluding  those projects with exceptionally
long Implementation  periods, the average  delay was 16 months. Only 20%
of projects were completed within six months of the expected time: over
60% were completed one year  later than forecast and nearly 30% of
projects  two  years  later  than  expected.  As  shown In  Figure 1,  In
percentage  terms 60% of projects had overruns of rrore than 30%  of the
original estimated time and 38% had overruns of 50% or more.  Twenty
percent of projects were forecast to be completed within 36 months of
Board approval, but only 5% actually were.  Overall, the average time
overrun  was 44%  of the original estimate.
A breakdown of project delays by component for a sample of
projects approved between  1967-78  Indicates  that distribution components
had the longest delays, averaging 22 months, followed by transmission
components with an average delay of 18 months.  This finding  Is not
altogether  surprising considering  that transmission  and distribution are the
components most frequently subject to change.  Hydro components  had
the lowest average  delay of 10 months,  followed by thermal stations  with 14
months. However,  the average  delay for hydro projects disguises  the very
high  time  overruns on  some  hydro  projects  because of  geological
difficulties  encouniered during  construction.  For  over  half  of  the
generation projects included In the sample a substantial portion of time
overruns  was due to delays  In complementary  transmission  (and  to a lesser
extent, distribution) components of the project.  Smaller components of
projects such as training and studies did not account for any significant
delays In the sample. On a Reglonal  basis, EMENA,  LAC,  and West Africa
had time overruns  of 51-59%,  while East Asia,  and East  Africa had overruns
of 43% and 53%, respectively. Insufficient data were available to give a
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There  have been some  variations  in  delays  In the  19808 on  a
Regional  basis,  but  little  change  In  the  overall  mean  value.  Ongoing
projects  In LAC have higher delays on average, mostly because of a lack of
funds  or slowdown  in demand.  The average delay In completion  In LAC
was 18% during the 1960s,  Increasing to 52% in the 1970s. West Africa has
shown  some  improvement  and  there  has  been  an  overall  consistent
performance in East Asia.
Prolect Costs
The  extent  to  which  projects  were  completed  within  the  cost
estimated at appraisal Is the third key Indicator of performance.  Given that
many project components are revised during implementation of the project
(see  Section  3.1),  cost  comparisons  are  often  difficult  to  make.
Transmission  and distribution  programs  pose a special  problem because
they  are  often  revised  according  to whether there  are  cost  overruns  or
underruns.  Therefore, there  may be no apparent change  In total  project
costs  because  substantial  cost  savings  or  overruns  could  have  been
masked by the project being scaled up or down accordingly.  Such hidden
factors have to be borne In mind when making cost comparisons  between
appraisal and completion.
For those projects approved between 1967-78 and completed  by
1986, there was an average coQt  overrun of 19%. About 18%  of projects had
cost overruns of more than 50% (Figure 2) and another 28% had overruns of
20-50%. Only 40% of projects were either less than or within  +10% of the
original  cost  estimate  and,  of  this,  12% were  more  than  10%  below
estimated  costs.  An  analysis  of  the  trend  over  time  shows  that  cost
overruns  were particularly  high  for those  projects  approved before 1974:
as shown  In Figure 3, the average cost overrun drops sharply from  1974
onwards and there Is a significant  difference between the averages for the
two  periods.  Those projects  approved before 1974 had an average cost
overrun  of 49% while  those approved from  1974 onwards actually  had a
cost  underrun.  An analysis  of  costs  of  projects  approved  In the  1980s
Indicates  that  on  avarape  there  has  continued  to  be  a  trend  of  cost-43 -
underruns. About two thirds of projects either had cost underruns  or were
within +10% of the estimated cost, a finding supported by the analysis of
1984 supervision reports carried out by the Energy Department.  More
projects approved  in the 1980s  had substantial  cost uriderruns  than those
approved In the second half of the 1970s  because  of the world recession
during the early 1980s.  Bqth International  and local competitive bids came
In lower  than expected  be4ause  of fierce competitlon  among contractors.
The above results Indicate that projects approved before and
completed after the 1973 oil crisis were subject to serious cost overruns
largely due to the completely unanticipated Inflation, particularly since
some projects approved  In the late 1960s  did not have  a provision for price
contingencies In the cost estimates. However,  It appears that once Bank
staff had adjusted to the new Inflationary  conditions, actual project costs
were more  In  line  with  estimated costs.  Apart from  those  projects
Implemented  during the oil crisis, the level of cost overruns appears to
have been reduced In the 19709  and 1980s  compared with those In the
19508 and 1960s. Available  cost data in the OED  surey  (whlch Is given for
each project component, not for the project as a whole) Indicates an
average  cost overrun of 13%  compared  to a negilgible overrun  for projects
approved for the  decade from 1974.  A significant part of  these cost
overruns  were for power  projects In Mexico  which had very high local cost
overruns  - these overruns were especially significant because  local costs
made  up 80%  of total costs, a far higher proportlon  than for other countries.
An analysis of cost overruns  by region shows that those for Latin
American  countries have  Increased  over  time. Durlng  the 19506  and 1960s,
average  cost overruns  were 18%  compared  with 42%  for projects approved
after 1967.  LAC had the highest cost overruns for projects approved
between 1967-78,  as shown In the table below.  Even with the 1973 oil
crisis, South Asia and EMENA  had cost underruns  on average,  while East
Asia kept to within +1  0%  of estimated  project costs.
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Figure  3: Trend  of Percentage  Cost Overruns.-46 -
The highest cost overruns broken down by project component
were for generation projects, wlth an average 28% overrun (for projects
approved In 1967-78). X detailed study of hydro projects approved In the
1970s showed far higLer cost  verruns  of 40% for  hydro components
compared to 18% for non-hydro.  Transmission  and distribution projects
Incurred lower overruns  of 16%  and 11%,  respectively, but these estimates
are not reliable because the quality and extent of technical Information
available from  both  Bank  reports and  utilities  do  not  permit  sound
conclusions to be drawn about costs.  This situation Is due In part to the
large  number  and  diversity  of  technical  specifications, small-size of
equipment, and frequent force account activities Involved In transmission
and distribution projects, all of which make It difficult to monitor project
performance.
One might expect to find a high correlation between  the amount
of cost and project Implementation  overruns,  given that delays can result In
cost Increases. However,  there appears  to be little correlation. This lack of
correlation between Increased costs and project delays can be partly
explained  by the fact that delays In project start-up need not affect project
costs.  Also, projects may be reduced In size so as to avoid total cost
overruns.
Disbursements
Taking  disbursements  from the time of Board  approval  to the date
of the final disbursement,  the average  perlod for a loan  to be disbursed was
69 months compared to an average Implementation  period of 66 months.
Most loans were disbursed over 5-8 years.  Two thirds of the loans were
disbursed over six or more years and 10% were disbursed over nine or
more years; only 3.5% were disbursed within three years, as shown In
Table 1.
4/ Geological Complicatlons and Cost Overruns - A  Survey of  Bank-
financed Hydroelectric Projects, Energy Department  Note No. 61, July
1985.-47-
Table I
Tlme Elapsed  between  Board  ApDrovai  and Final Disbursement
Years  of  Number  of  Percent  Cumulative
Disbursements  Prols  of Prolects  Percent
,  -0.0%  0.0%
1  0  0.0%  0.0%
2  1  0.9%  0.9%
3  3  2.6%  3.5%
4  9  7.8%  11.3%
5  21  18.3%  29.6%
6  26  22.6%  52.2%
7  26  22.6%  74.8%
8  16  13.9%  88.7%
9  6  5.2%  93.9%
10  4.3%  98.3%
11  1  0.9%  99.1%
12  1  0.9%  100.0%
115 observations  for projects  approved  1965  -1979
A comparison of actual disbursements  with that forecs  shows
that actual disbursements  have continually lagged behind those forecast
from the 19508  to the 1980,  particularly In the first three years of project
Implementation. From  the limited data available,  i  appears  that the lag has
Increased over time despite repeated efforts by the  Bank to  Improve
forecasts and speed up claims for reimbursement  For projects approved
In the late 1960s  and 1970s,  disbursements  were only 26%  of that forecast
In the first year of the project and 48%  In the second year. Disbursements
gradually caught up with those forecast from year three to  year five.
Becaus  some projects require more than five years to  complete, the
cumulatve percentage  of total disbursements  levels off at about 90% of
forecast from years 6-8 and reaches 100% only upon completion of all
projects by  about yeari 10.  Although a similar pattem was found for
projects  approved  In  the  1950s  and  1960s, the  actual  level  of
disbursements  was  higher  at  the  different  stages  of  project
Implementatlon. This deterioratlon In the rate of disbursement  durlng the
first two years bf project Implementation  appears to have continued for
projects appro\#.d  In the 1980s. Disbursements  were only 36%  and 53%  of-48-
forecast In the second and third years ot the project, compared with 48%
and 53%  respectively,  In the 1970s.
2.5  Economic  AsPects  of Prolect  and Sector Performance
Rate  of Return  on the Prolect
Comparisons of rates of return on projects over time is difficult
since they have not been estimated  on a consistent basis. For example,  In
the early 1970s, financial rates of  return were calculated but different
methods of estimation were used, particularly to value benefits.  Later In
the 1970s,  economic rates bf return were required for projects but these
have often not been estimated  with consistency,  especially concerning  the
treatment of taxes and duties.  The audits have  reestimated  rates of return
on the  completed project, supposedly using the same method as  at
appraisal. However,  It was not alwavs  readliv apparent  lust how the rate ot
return had  been originally estimated, particularly for the older proJects.
Therefore,  the following results  should be Interpreted  with some caution.
On average, rates of return estimated at appraisal were 14.6%
compared to reestimated rates of return at project completion of 11.7%.
About 18%  of projects had reestimated  rates  of return that were within one
percentage  point of those originally estimated and 35%  were within three
percentage points.  More projects had substantially lower rates of return
been originally estimated,  particularly for the older projects. Therefore,  the
following resuls should be Interpreted  with some  caution.
On average, rates of return estimated at appraisal were 14.6%
compared to reestimated rates of return at project completion of 11.7%.
About 18%  of projects had rentimated  rates  of return that were within one
percentage  point of those originally estimated and 35%  were within three
percentage  points.  More projects had substc-itlally lower rates of return
than projects with a higher retum - 42%  had rates of return three or more-49-
percentage  points  below  that  originally  estimated  and  21% had  returns
higher than estimated by more than three percentage points.
Justification ot the Investment Proaram
During the 1970s,  the Bank adopted the criterion that the selected
project should be part of the least cost Investment program for the power
sector. Exceptions were made where there was an urgent requirement for
additional generating capability; hence, a project could be selected It It was
already prepared and ready for Implementation, even though  It might  not
have been part of the least cost. program.  Usually, most appraisal reports
commented  on the  Investment program  for  the power sector  and stated
whether or not It had been optimized to minimize cost.  Unfortunately, the
project  audit  process  does.  not  Involve  a  reevaluation  of  the  total
Investment  program  so  that  there  Is  no  Information  on  whether  the
Investment program Implemented during the project did In fact turn out to
be the least cost program.
The analysis of past Investment programs Is rarely carried out by
the Bank.  In addition, very little data Is available concerning the amount of
the  original  Investment  program  actually  completed  by  the  end  of  the
project or the economic consequences of reductions or expansions of the
original program  agreed In the loan documents.  However, It does appear
that the majority of Investment programs were completed In the 1970s, but
probably with one to two years delay, In line with average delays  in project
Implementation.  About 15-20% of utilitles  had to significantly  cut back on
their Investment programs.
Planning
Lack of planning was cited as a 3erious problem In several of the
audit  reports  for  the projects  Implemented  during the  early  1970s.  This
lack  of planning  led to uneconomic  Investments.  However, power sector-50 -
planning has undoubtedly  Improved  over the past twenty to thirty years, as
the need for more rlgo ous planning became apparant once the obvious
Initial Investments  had been  made. As power  systems  began  to grow, more
use was made of discounted cashflow analysis and optimizing techniques
to  determine the least cost expansion programs.  With the  Increasing
uncertainty  over oil prices, exchange  rates and the effect of highly variable
economic conditions on the level of demand, It has become even more
Important  to  Investigate different  scenarios  and  carry  out  detailed
economic planning of the system, and many Bank projects have financed
studies for power  system master  plans.
However,  a problem remains as master plans become outdated
and require continual revision on account of rapidly changing conditions.
Many utilities still have not developed  the capability to undertake  detailed
planning activities and may often be pressured  to opt for projects that may
not be optimal because  of financing constraints  or political pressures. This
Is frequently the case with hydro projects which are highly visible and are
regarded  as prestigious projects by Governments.
Tarifts
The overall level and structure of tariffs will be a crucial factor In
providing Incentives  for rational use of electricity and load management.  In
the 1950s  and 1960s, very little attention was paid to the economic aspects
of tariff setting and the prevailing assumption  was that tariffs should be
determined  according to global financial criteria. The Bank has supported
marginal cost pricing  over the last fifteen years and has persuaded a
significant number of utilities to  set tariffs according to  marginal cost
pricing criteria so that consumers would be charged the amount winch
correctly reflected  the value  of the resources  required  for power  supply.
5/  M. Mukiasinghe  and J.J. Warford, Electricity Pricing, Johns Hopkins
Univ. Prass.  T3aitirre,  MD,  1982.-51 -
By 1982,  about 44 efficiency pricing studies had been completed
and a  further 25 were under way.  Some 20 countries had Incorporated
efficlency  pricing  principles,  either  fully  or  partially,  Into their  tariff
structures.  However,  the spread of efficiency pricing has been slow In
some countrles, because  the concept has been resisted qulte strongly on
the grounds that electric power Is a public service and therefore  should be
sold at a price sufficient only to recover  historical costs.
2.6 Demand  Forecasts
Since t,he energy (GWh) forecast Is the starting point for both
power  system and financial planning,  the preparatlon  of a realistic demand
forecast Is a key element  ln project  success. There  Is a normal  tendency  to
be optimistic In forecastinb  sales; hence,  one  would expect  a priori to see a
higher  proportion of  actual sales being  lesa than the  forecast value.
Surprisingly, on average  the overestimatlon  of sales forecasts for projects
approved  from 1967-78  was comparatively  small, I.e.,  actual  sales at project
completion were 6.4% lower than forecast for the period as a whole.
However,  as shown In Figure 4, there has been a definite downward  trend
In accuracy throughout the 1970s.  Prior to  1973, forecasts were, on
average,  accurate In assessing  the actual  sales at completion  of the project
and for  projects approved In 1969-70  actual sales at completion were
actually higher than estimated at appraisal. This situation was thereafter
was reversed  as forecasts urned out to be more and more over-optimistic,
until  for  projects  approved  In  1978  forecasts  were  on  average
overestimating  sales at project completion by about 20%. This trend has
continued for projects approved In the 1980s,  with actual sales 17% less
than originally forecast
Close  to  half  the  projects  approved  between  1967-78
overestimated demand by  10% or  more  (particularly In the post-1973
perlod), compared to about 70%  of projects In the 1980s. About 30% of
projects overestimated  demand by more than 20% during the 1970s  and
1980s. On the other hand,  only 13%  of projects exceeded  the forecast level
of sales by more than 10%  during both perlods. For projects Implemented-52 -
during the  1950s and 1960s, demand estimates generally were more
accurate. A survey  of 75 Bank loans  to 37 countries In the 19506  and 19606
found that, on average, sales forecasts were only 2% more than actual
sales, but that with certain  loban  there was a large discrepancy  between  the
forecast and actual amounts.  For projects approved In the 1950s and
19608,  the standard  deviation  of actual energy sales from that forecast  was
38%,  which Is the same  as was found In a similar study by OED.
On a Regional  basis, sales for East  Asia utilities were almost  the
same as forecast during the 1970s  and for East  Africa were only 6% below
that forecast. LAC  actually exceeded  the forecast level of sales by 5%,  but
has  since  had  considerable overestimates.  Other  regions  showed
significant overoptimism  by as much as 23%  In South  Asia, 18%  In EMENA,
and 17%  In West  Africa.
2.7 Financial  Performance  of Power  Prolects  and  the Sector
An Integral part of any Bank-financed  project Is to  ensure the
financial health and stability of the Borrower. The eventual  aim Is to make
the utility financially Independent  so that It Is able to fund a substantial
portion of its Investment  program from Internal sources and Is sufficiently
credit-worthy  to ralse the remaining funds from commerclal  sources (both
local and forelgn). The fundamental  flnancial soundness  of a utility can be
measured by five key ratios - (I) rate of return on assets, (II) operating
ratio,  (Ill)  self-financing ratio,  (lv)  debt  service  ratio  and  (v)  days
receivables.  The  debt/equity  ratio  Is  also  an  Indicator of  financial
performance  where the debt Is not owed to government. However,  many
utilities In developing countries borrow heavily  from govemment,  but when
In flnancial straits this debt Is often  waived,  Interest  payments  rescheduled,
or the debt converted  to equity.  Given  the problems of definition of debt,
revaluation and conversion of  debt,  and revaluation of  assets, It was
decided to  focus'only  on one capital structure ratio l.e., debt service
coverage.
6/ "Ex-post  Evaluation  of  Electricity  Demand  Forecasts,"  Energy
Department  Note  No. 79. June 1975.- 53 -
The use of various financial ratios to  evaluate performance at
different times Is fraught with difficultles, but In a study of this nature It Is
not possible to do otherwise.  The accounting definitions have changed
over time so that the ratios have been calculated on different bases.  For
example,  In some cases  the basis for estimating  the rate of depreciation  of
assets has changed,  affecting nearly all the financial ratios; the method of
estimating the asset base on which the rate of return Is calculated has
changed; and the treatment  of bad debts has changed,  affecting the days
receivables ratio.  Whether  the effect of such changes  overall cancels out
when aggregating the data is not clear.  In addition to the definition of
financial  ratios, there are often many  problems  with accounting  practices  In
utilities, which leads  to under-  or over-estimation  of many  of these  ratios.
As shown In Figures  5 to 9, there has been a distinct deterloration
In the trend of financial ratios for the period 1968-85. In the case of the
operating  ratio  and  days  receivables,  an  upward  trand  Indlcates
deterioration while for all others a downward  trend shows worsening. The
deteriorating  trend began  to appear even before the Impact of the first  oil
crisis In 1973-4  and has worsened  steadily  thereafter.
Table 2 summarizes the  average value for  each ratio In the
periods  In  1968-1973,  1974-1979,  and 1980-1985  which  correspond to
distinct periods surrounding the oil crises. All ratios behave  consistently
and, given the number of observations In each case, the differences In
each period  are  significant.  Outliers  relating to  particularly unusual
circumstances  have  been  removed  from the data to avoid blas. The results
Indicate that many utilities are now In a very poor financial position, for
example, an operating ratio of greater than 1.0, a negative rate of return,
zero  self-financing,  and no debt service coverage.-54 -
Table 2
Trend of Key Financial Indicators
a/  Average
Financial Ratio  1966/73  1974/79  1980/85  1966/85
Operating ratio  0.68  0.73  0.80  0.74
Rate of return  9.2  7.9  6.0  7.9
Days receivable  77  97  112  96
Self-financing ratio  24.6  18.6  17.2  20.1
Debt service ratio  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.8
a/  Financial  ratios  correspond  to  actual  values  at  appraisal,
completion,  or supervision, depending on project status.
According  to the OED review In 1972, there were higher rates ot
return  on assets and higher self-financing  ratios  for utilities  In the 1960s.
Most rates of return fell  within  the 8-9% range, compared wlth the  much
wider  spread  In  the  fi9lowing  twenty  years,  while  self-financing  ratios
averaged about 30% compared to 20% for the three periods above. Internal
cash generation had Improved throughout  the 1950s and 1960s for six out
of the seven entitles studied which  led OED to conclude that there would
be a continual strengtheninsof  utilfites' financial situation.
Rate of Return on Assets
The financial  rate of return on assets has always been one of the
Indicators  used  by  the  Bank  to  monitor  the  financial  performance  of
entities,  and there  Is a widespread  practice  of using  a revenue covenant
based on self-financing tOrgets In place of, or In addition to, a rate of return
covenant.  The  rate  of return  should  be  reported  on  a pro  forma  basis
where not formally  required  by the government  and should  be calculated
on revalued assetE.  It appears, however that many estimates In appraisal
and audit reports  (particularly  for projects  approved In the late 1960s and
1970s) were calculated  on an historical  value of assets base.  Therefore,
the comparison  of rates of return at project completion with those forecast
Includes cases where rate of return estimates were based on both revalued
and historical assets.20  - 20%
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FIgure  9: Trend  of Days  Recelvable.-61 -
As Indicated  In Table 2, the average rate of return for the period
1966-85  was 7.9%. However, the deviation about the mean was substantial,
as can be seen from Table 3.
Table 3
Distribution of the Rate of Return on Assets
Rate of Return  For Projects  For Projects
At Project Complel'on  Approved in 1966-78  Approved in 1979-83
%  _  No. of Projects  %  No. of  Proiects  %
Below  4.0  23  22  13  40
4.1  - 6.0  20  10  5  15
6.1  - 8.0  17  17  4  12
8.1  - 10.0  13  13  7  21
10.1  - 12.0  12  12  0  0
12.1  - 14.0  7  7  0  0
Over  14.0  10  10  4  12
_  _  __  1002100  33  X
For projects approved between 1966-78, 22% of utilities  had rates
of return equal to or less than 4% at project completion,  and 17% had rates
of return of over 12%. The situation has deteriorated for ongoing projects
In 1984, when 40% of utilities  had rates of return of 4% or less and only 12%
had rates of return over 12.0%.  Part of this deterioration was due to more
rates of return belrig based on revalued assets.
Fur orojects approved between 1968-78,  about 18% had the same
return as forocast at project completion  and another 26% achieved higher
rates of return than forecast.  However, 55% of projects had lower returns
than forecast and 43% of projects were below the targeted rate of return by
more than three percentage points.  For projects approved In the late 1960s
and  1970s there  appears to  have been an  Increasing deviation  between
actual  and  forecast  returns  over  time,  particularly  for  those  projects
Implemented during or after the oil crisis.  This trend also appears to have
continued for those projects Implemented during the 1980s. The situatlon
appears to have been better for projects Implemented during the 1950s and
1960s, when a higher percentage achieved the targeted rate of return.-62-
Ooeratina  Ratio
The average operating ratio for the period 1966-85  was 0.74.
There was a significant deterioration between the periods 1966-73  and
1980-85,  when operating  ratios Increased  from an average  0.68  to 0.80.
For  projects  approved In  the  late  1960s and  19709, actual
operating ratios at project completion have, on the whole, been far lower
than forecast at appraisal. Nearly  two thirds of the projects approved  from
1967-78 (all  completed by  1982) had operating ratios  more than  five
percentage  points over that forecast at the time of project completion (i.e.,
the operating ratio was worse than forecast). Over half were more than 10
percentage points over that forecast and about 30%  were 20 percentage
points of that forecast. Only 9%  of projects had lower operating  ratios than
forecast (i.e., performance  was better than forecast).
There appears to have been a quantum deterioration after 1973
when oil price Increases caused a jump In operating expenses  for many
utilities:  the difference between  forecast and actual operating ratios was
far smaller, on average,  for projects approved  In the late 1960s  and mostly
Implemented before the oil  price Increases than for those either under
implementation during the oil  crisis  or approved after 1973.  To some
extent, the effects of the oll  price Increases were recognized In Bank
appraisals since the forecast operating ratios  were not as high as had been
forecast before the oil  crisis. Nevertheless, operating ratios at project
completion were 8' ill substantially poorer than those forecast. For projects
Implemented  during the 1080s  there appears  to be a similar margin of error
In forecast and actual operating  ratios as for projects  approved  In the 1970S
after the oil crisis.
Nearly  40%  of utilities had approximately  the same (either plus or
minus five percentage  points) operating ratios at project completion and
appraisal,  and another  25%  of utilities had Improved  thelr operating  ratio by
project completion.  However, one third  of  utilities actually had worse
operating ratios at project completion than at appraisal.  Of particulara63-
concern Is the performance  of the 28%  of utilities that had poor operating
ratios at appraisal (I.e.,  0.80 and over): about three quarters elther did not
significantly  Improve  their  performance  or  performance  actually
deteriorated  during the 'course  of the project.
Fro,m  a regional point of view, utilities In East Africa were more
successful at meeting the forecast operating ratio and thereby Improving
financial performance during the course of project Implementation  than
other regions, as can be seen In Table 4.  EMENA  was particularly poor at
meeting the forecast operating ratlo, followed by LAC,  and East  and South
Asia.
Table  4
Reg  onal Breakdown  of Operatina  Ratios  for Completed  Prolects
E. Asia  S.  Asia  E.  Africa  W.  Africa  LAC  EMENA
Averaae
SAR  Forecasi  u.7o  0.61  0.60  0.67  0.54  0.67
0.62
Actual at
Completion  0.80  0.79  0.66  0.80  0.65  0.86
0.75
Self-financina  Ratio
The  self-financing ratio  Is  an  Indicator of  the  success and
sustainability  of  a  utility  an'd measures the  amount  of  Investment
requirements  financed  by Intemal cash generation. Unfortunately,  It Is one
of the hardest ratios  to compare  from one project  to another  because  of the
Inconsistent ways In which n Is estimated, despite very specific OMS
guidelines. Many estimates  In appraisal  reports do not Include  changes  In
working capial  and a few even exclude payment of taxes. Consequently,
the self-financing ratlo had to be reestimated  for a sample of projects for
the purpose  of this review  according  to the standard  OMS  deflnition:-64-
"funds from Intemal sources equivalent  to a defined percentage
of average annual capial  expenditures, after meeting operating
expenses  (before allowance  for depreciation),  debt service,  taxes,
dividends, Increases  In working capital, and other significant cash
outflows,  excluding capital expenditures."
Estimating self-financing ratios  In  accordance with  the  OMS
definition In many Instances  lowers the ratio (on average by 25%). The
serious effect of 'nt  Including changes In working capital In the definition
of covenants  Is rather dramatically  Illustrated In the case of a recent review
of the Internal cash generation  of 14 state electricity boards (SEBs)  In India
for the purpose of meeting the requirements  of a rural electrification loan.
Action Plans submitted to the Bank for the SEBs Indicated that In most
years over the period FY 1986-90,  12 out of 14 SEBs  would meet a 20%
contribution criterla for disbursement  of the loan. The covenant  had been
defined In a way  that excluded  changes  In working  capital. The Inclusion  of
such changes  would, on the figures submitted,  have  reduced  the number  of
SEBs  likely to meet  the 20%  contribution over  the same period, to just two.
Further analysis of current assets revealed that probably nine electricity
boards did not have any working capital at all, I.e., they wore technically
Insolvent.
The average  self-financing ratio for the period 196645 (including
the sample of completed projects and those under supervision)  was below
20%, with a decline from 25% to 17% between  the periods 1966-73  and
1980.85. The deviation about  the mean  was substantial,  as can be seen In
Table  5 for completed projects, durlng 1966-83.6es-
TABLE  5
Self-financing  Ratios  for Comoleted  Prolects.  1966-83
Projects  (with
Self-financing  Ratio  Estimated  Ratios
at Prolect  Comoletlon  In Sam le Survey
Numb  er  %__
0  10  21
1 tolO  9  19
11  to 20  8  17
21 to30  10  21
31  to40  6  13
41 to60  3  7
over 60  1  2
Average  Ratio  18  Total  47  100
One of the weakest areas of forecasting appears to be for self-
financing ratios, for they are not only consistently cverestimated  but also
the magnitude of error Is one ot the highest.  In about 65%  of cases, the
actual self-financing ratio was more than five percentage  points below  that
for=ast  Of particular concem Is the 31%  of Instances  where the actual
ratlo was more than 20 percentage  polnts below that forecast and the 7%  of
projects where It was more than 50%  below that forecast. The actual ratio
was higher than forecast In only 14% of cases.  The magnitude of the
forecasting error on average has Increased since the early 19708 and
appears  to have  continued  to deteriorate  In the 1980s.
About 42% of projects actually had lower self-financing ratios at
completion of the project than at appralsal and one half of these projects
had ratlos tha. .#"re  more than 20%  lower. Of the one half of projects  where
utilities had poor ratlos at appraisal (I.e., 20% and lower), nearly 50% of
utlittls  had  managed to  Increase self-financing by  more  than  five
percentage polnts by the end of the project.  However, 25% of utilitles
actually had ratlos  that had deteriorated  even  further.-66  -
Debt Service  Ratio
The debt service ratio Is a good measure  of whether  the utility has
eamed sufficient revenues  to meet principal and Interest commitments  on
outstanding debt  after meeting operating costs  (before allowance for
depreciation  and after taxes) and it takes Into account  the terms of debt as
well as the oveeall  amount. The ratio can sometimes  give the Impression  of
a higher than actual performance of utilities  because It does not take
account of  the  waiving of  debt  repayments to  government, Indefinite
rescheduling  of debt payments  or subsidized  Interest rates  by government,
as Is often  the case  for utilities In developing  countries.
The average  debt service ratio for the period 1966-85  was 1.8: the
deviation  about the mean  Is not as great as for other financial perfor;;ance
Indicators,  as can be seen In Table  6.
TABLE  6
Debt Service  Ratio  for ComDleted  Prolects
Debt  Service  Ratio  No.  of  Porcent  of
at Prolect  Completion  Prolects  Prolects
4.0  2  4
3.1 to 4.0  4  9
2.1 to 3.0  12  27
1.1 to 2.0  21  47
1.0  6  13
Total  U  w
About half of the projects had debt service ratios that were the
same at completion of the project as forecast at appraisal (i.e., plus or
mlinus  0.5)  and another 16%  were even  higher. One  third of the projects  did
not meet the debt service ratio targets and half of these were more than
orie point below the forecast level. There appears  to be little difference In
performance for projects Implemented  during the 19709  or 1980s.  Just-67-
over one quarter of projects had debt service ratios that were higher at the
end of the project than at appraisal and another  40%  were about the same.
One third of debt service ratios had declined during the course of the
project.  Of the 50% of projects that had poor debt  servlce ratlos at
appralsal (2.0  or less), one half had not changed  significantly by the end of
the project and another  quarter  had actually  deteriorated.
Davs  Receivable
The  number  of  days  receivable Is  a  good Indicator of the
collection and commercial operations of a utility.  Consequently,  It Is as
much an Indicator of Institutional performance  as an Important  component
of working capital. For utilitles with a monthly  biling  cycle (most utilities),
the Bank normally regards 60 days as a reasonable value for a well-
managed  power company (although  norms may  vary according to country)
and Indeed the mean value of forecasts made at appralsal was 63 days.
Unfortunately,  performance  by utilities fell far short of this target since the
average  for recelvables  was 96 days. There has been a clear deterloratlon
over time, as can be seen In Table 7.  Receivables  Increased  from 77 days
In the period 1966-73  to 112  days In the perlod 1980485.
TABLE  7
Days  Receivable  for Completed  Prolects
Days
Receivables E.Asl.  S.Asla  E.  Africa  W.  Africa  LAC EMENA  Averaae
At Appraisal  84  86  120  93  73  152  94
At Project
Completlon  107  97  128  177  91  121  108
Only  18% of projects actually met the forecast number of days
receivable (plus or minus ten days) by the end of the project and another
5%  were hligher. Of the 77%  of projects  that did not meet  the forecast level,a 68- 
three quarters had days receivable more than 20 days higher than the
forecasted level.
Days receivable Improved  from appraisal  to project completion
for about 30%  of projects, but for another 30%  of projects days recelvable
actually deteriorated, Increasing  by more than 20 days In most cases. For
the 40%  of utilities with poor performance  at the beginning of the project
(I.e., 90 days and over), on;y half managed  to Improve performance (by
more than  ten  days) and  nearly 30% actually had even higher days
recelvable  by the end of the project. The percentage  of projects which had
a  poorer performance at project completion than at appraisal appears to
have  Increased  In the 1980s.
Overall, the West Africa region had the greatest  deterioration In
receivables  from appraisal to completion:  EMENA  was the only region to
Improve performance  durlng the course of the project, as can be seen In
Table  7.
Revaluation  of Assets
It Is now normal practice  for the Bank  to require the calculation  of
rates of  return on the  basis of  revalued assets.  In some countries,
however, revaluation  of asets  for the purpose of calculating depreciation
or preparing financial statements Is not permitted; thus, not all  power
utilitles could be expected to revalue  their assets. About 42% of projects
were for entitles which revalued  assets  as a matter  of course,  particularly In
LAC where asseti  revaluatlon  had become necessary due to the endemic
Inflation that  had begun earlier than  In other regions.  No trend was
observable despite the general rise In Inflation during the 19709  which
could be expected  to lead  to the recognition  of the need  to revalue  asesets.-69  -
2.8  Institutional Performance
Performance,  or  eofficlency  Indicators which  can be relatively
easily measured with a limited  amount of data (given the lack of avallable
data  for  many  utilties)  have  not  yet  been  developed.  Therefore,  to
compare the efficiency of utilities  In the past with the situation  of today Is
Imprecise  at best.  Because  of  high  growth  rates of  demand,  In some
countries  up to 15% p.a. over a ton year period,  the plant In service has
doubled  In seven  to ten  years.  The  requirements  for  maintenance  and
efficient  operations have Increased commensurately and have strained the
available  management  and  manpower  resources.  It  would  r.ot  be
surprising  therefore to see a deterioration In the efficiency of operations of
many  utilities.  Changing external  conditlons,  such  as foreign  exchange
shortages,  cumbersome  government  -'ocurement  procedures,  greater
numbers  of  potential  suppliers  (both  foreign  and  local)  and  volatile
economic  conditions,  make  the job  of  managing  i  modern  utility  more
difficult  than  In  earlier  decades.  A  few  Indicators  were  reviewed  to
determine the trends over time, but all of them have limitations  so that the
results should be Interpreted with caution.
Number of Consumers oer Emplovee
This value Is often used as a performance Indicator by the Bank
since It partially  explains how esficiently labor Is used.  However, the ratio
Itself will  not be the result simply  of the level of performance of the utiigty
since  this  will  depend  on  the  function  of  the  utility,  I.e., whether  It  Is
responsible  for generation, transmission  and/or distribution.  The staffing
level and hence the efficiency criteria would be different for each activity.
In addftlon, the utility's  use of force account constructlon  labor as opposed
to outside contractors  will also affect the approprlate  efficiency  criteria to
be  used.  Excluding  those  utilities  that  had  bulk  supply  customers,  a
sample of utilities  In the 1980s  showed that about two thirds  had fewer than
100 connections  per employee  which  Is a poor  ratio even assuming  the
company  undertakes  force  account  construction.  Only  three  out  of 26- 70 -
utilities studied had more than 150 consumers  per employee,  a fair
performance  for an average  utility Involved  In distribution  activities  and  not
carrying  out  significant  force  account  work.
Maintenance
A review  of appraisal  reports  produced  In  the  1980s  Indicated  that
the level  of maintenance  varied  considerably  from one utility to another.
Good maintenance  Is a  contributing factor to  achieving  higher plant
availability  and efficient  distribution  and,  therefore,  more  reliable  service.
Of course,  poor  maintenance  may  not necessarily  denote  only Inefficiency
on the  part  of the  utility, for It could  also  result  from  lack  of funds  or foreign
exchange  for spare parts, and other factors  which may be outside  the
control  of the utility.
Quantitative  measures  of the adequacy  of  maintenance  are
difficult to establish;  hence,  i  was necessary  to accept  the evaluations
given in the appraisal  reports. These  evaluations  were ranked  on a five
point scale from very good to very poor.  For projects  approved  In the
1980s,  twelve  out  of 26 utilities  fell Into  the  poor  to very  poor  range  - four  In
Africa,  threa  In Latin  America  and  three  In S.  Asia.  On  the other  hand,  nine
utilities  fell Into  the good  to very  good  range  - three  In E.  Asia,  two In LAC
and  two In S. Asia. Most  of th'ese  utilities  had been  established  for many
years so that'there had been the opportunity  to gain experience  and
Improve  maintenance  over  the  years.
Overall  Utility  Efficiency
A similar  rating  of the overall  efficiency  of utilities  was  carried  out
as above  for a sample  of projects  Implemented  In the 1970s  and 1980s.
The  evaluation  was based  on the appraisal  and audit  reports'  assessment
of Institutional  performance,  which  may  not  be entirely  consistent  given  the
lack  of precise  criteria  and  the  need  for judgement  on the  part  of Bank  staff.-71 -
Based on a rating of one to five, the performance  of utilitles In the 1908s
appears,  on average,  about the same as during the late 19608  and 19709.
The  average utility  falls  In  the  "fair"  range.  In  the  mid-1970s, the
percentage of  utilltles  with  poor  performance Increased quite  sharply
(33%),  due In part to the Bank lending for the first time to new Borrowers
with limited resources  and experience.
W. Africa had the lowest overall  rating of Institutional  performance
and E. Asia the highest.  These findings should be viewed with great
caution because of the different circumstances of utilities In the 1980s,
especially  In terms of the Increased  magnitude  of operatlons  and changing
external environment, and  because of  the  subjective  nature of  the
evaluation  of pe'ormance.
The project audit reports Include  a rating of the extent  to which
utilities achieved the Institutional targets set at appraisal.  About 74% of
projects were assesed  as fair to good at having achieved institutlonal
targets and another 6% met such targets to  a llmited extent.  Twenty
percent  of  projects  were  judged  Ps  having  not  met  them  at  all.
Unfortunately, Institutional targets are often not clearly stated In many
appraisal reports and more often than not the completion reports and
appraisal reports were prepared by different project staff.  It  Is  likely,
therefore,  that institutional performance  has been assessed  as poor only In
those cases where there were obvious Institutional problems rather than
when there were continuing but less glarlng Inefficiencies.
2.9 Conformitv  With Loan  Covenants
Conformity with  loan  covenants  was  assessed for projects
Included  In the two sample  surveys of projects Implemented  from 1968-83.
Rating  of the utnitles' conformity wlth loan covenants  was based  on a scale
of one to five where one equalled 100%  conformity and five no conformity
at all.  On average,  there were seven malor covenants  per project.  Those
covenants that are repeatedly found In loan agreements  mostly concern-72-
financial Issues, Including financial ratio targets, revaluation of  assets,
auditing  requirements, tariff  Increases and  tariff  structures.  Other
covenants relate to Improvements  In planning, the structure of the power
sector, the efficiency of the utility, and senior management  appointments
by the Borrower.
Based  on an average  of ratings  for all covenants  for each project,
about 38% of  utilities  were considered to  have conformed with  loan
covenants and about another third were rated as fair.  Thirty percent of
utilities were considered  to have  not conformed  with many  of the covenants
at all.  An  evident limitation of  this  averaging approach Is that each
covenant Is  given  equal  weight;  however, some  are  obviously more
Important than others.  Nonetheless,  any weighting scheme would be as
arbitrary  as the system  of equal  weights.
Those covenants that  had the  poorest conformity were those
relating to rates  of retum on assets  and days receivable. Nineteen  out of 36
utilitles did not meet  the rate of return covenants,  whether  the retums were
based on revalued  or historical assets (see  Table  8). In both cases  most of
the targets were  set at 8-10%.  This finding Is not surprlsing considering  the
large number of projects that failed to meet the forecast rate of retum, as
discussed In Section 2.7. The situation seems to have deteriorated even
more for those projects Implemented  durlng the 1980s,  since nearly two
thirds did not meet the rate of return covenant.  Fifty percent of utilitles
failed to conform to the days receivable  covenant  - most of these had poor
receivables at  appraisal which  was the  reason for  Including  such  a
covenant In  the  first  place.  Again,  the  situatlon  appears to  have
deteriorated  during the 19809  when more utilitles were not conforming  with
the days recelvalple  covenants. The situation appears  to have  been better
during the 19509 and 19605  when such covenants  were met on the whole,
although  often after some  delays..73  -
TABLE 8
Conformity with Loan Covenants for ComPleted Projects 1966-1982
Coveriant  Number of Prolects Accordina to
Conformitv Ratina
1  2  3  4  5  N/A  Total
Rate of return on  3  1  0  0  6  1  11
historical assets
Rate of return on  8  2  2  5  8  25
revalued assets
Debt service coverage  29  2  0  5  4  1  41
Self-financing ratio  3  4  0  2  1  10
Other financial ratios  3  5  0  0  1  9
Tariff Increase, or  15  2  0  5  4  1  27
no reductlons, change
In tariff structure
Days receivables,  2  2  0  1  5  10
govL pay arrears
Economical/financial  18  1  0  3  1  1  24
planning, Bank
concurrence re changes




Powersectorchanges  14  0  1  1  3  2  19
Tariff or marginal cost study  6  0  1  0  0  7
Submission of audits  20  2  1  6  0  2  31
Appointments to  16  0  1  0  1  18
senior management
Asset revaluation  10  1  1  3  2  17
Improve efficiency of  13  1  1  1  4  1  21
utility
Umt  on Investment  7  0  0  0  0  7
In other activitles
Other  22  1  0  8  8  4  43
Total  205  25  8  44  48  13  343
a/  Total of 50 projects.  Each project had more than one covenant.
Rating key:  I  =  100%  conformity
5  =  no conformity whatsoever
n/a  =  Information not available-74
III. REASONS  FOR  PROJECT  AND  SECTOR  PERFORMANCE
The  reasons for  project and sector performance  can be broken
down Into three separate  categories:  (1)  those that are outside  the control of
the utlll*y and the national govemment,  such as natural disasters, world
economic conditions and unstable security situation, (11)  those that are
outside the control of the utility but which can be controlled by national
govemments,  such  as  tariff  setting,  broad  Investment policy  and
procurement procedures; and (111)  those that are within the control of the
utility, such as management,  planning  and programming  of work. Not all of
the variables  that affect performance  fall Into only one category  for there Is
obviously some overlap; for example, high losses may not only be due to
the poor performance  of the utility but also to the government's  reluctance
to prosecute those with Illegal connections  or to allow the utility to cut off
the supply of electricity for non-payment  of bills. Several  variables usually
account for  differing  levels of  performance but  i  Is  not possible to
determine the sensitivity of overall performance  to changes In only one
variable.  Many factors are difficult to quantify and Isolating the effect of
Individual  variables Is equally  difficult  With these polnts In mind, the three
categories  of factors affecting  performance  were examined.
3.1 Exoaenous  Factors
Exogenous  factors  whlch are essentially  outside  the control of the
power entity or national  government  only partially explained  either good or
poor performance of utilitles.  Of those projects which had significant
delays, 15% cited external events as the cause of  delay for  any one
component of the project, such as Intemal security problems, security
problems In other countries through which goods for the project had to be
transported,  poor weather,  and major  natural  disasters. More projects  were
affected by the country's deteriorating economic situation; about 25% of
projeuts were delayed  because  of lack of funds for the project. Most of the
shortage of funds appears to  have been forelgn exchange, particularly
where  there  were  cost  overruns  (although  there  may  have  been-75 
misreporting of  shortage of  foreign  exchange where  Borrowers were
unable to provide the local currency counterpart). Lack of funds has been
a particular  problem during the 19808.
About  60%  of projects with delays cited contractor problems as
one of the reasons for the delay and nearly 40% cited late delivery of
equipment.  Such problems Involved poor management  of construction
works by the contractor (both local and foreign), poor supervision by
consultants, and dismissal of the contractor or supervising consultants
because  of Incompetence.  These  causes  have  been  labelled as exogenous
factors but In reality part of the problem stems from the weak control by
utilities  themselves.  Contractors frequently complain of  poor  project
management by  the  utility  and  often  the  contractor's  unsatisfactory
performance  Is allowed to continue for far too long before the utility takes
decisive actlon.
General world economic conditions over the study period were
obviously the main extemal factors that affected the success of projects
and sector  performance.  However, the  power sector  was frequently
adversely affected by not only downturns In the world economy, but also
the  poor  adjustment to  those  deteriorating  conditions  by  national
governments.' As a result, local Inflation was often Increased  by factors
other than changing external economic conditlons.  However,  a detailed
study would be required to determine the extent to which power sectors
were affected by purely extemal economic conditions and purely national
economic  policies.
Naturally,  the  most  significant  effect of changing external
economic conditlons was on the level of demand for power and financial
performance. For  60%  of cases  where  the demand  forecast  for power  sales
was not met, a principal reason given was an unexpected  downturn In the
economy  or an unexpected  downtum In one Important  consuming  sector of
the economy.-76-
Inflation
Not  surprisingly, over one half of the projects which had cost
overruns gave Inflation or  an  Increase In the  price  of  key  Items of
equipment as one of the reasons  for Increased  costs.  About one third of
these projects suffered from particularly high Increases  In local costs. On
the other hand, the effect of world recession In the early 1980s  has had a
beneficial effect on costs Insofar as  the resulting competitlon for contract
awards  has led to lower costs  and significant cost underruns  (for about  one
half of the projects  with cost underruns).
The effect of Inflation  on the financial performance  of utilitles has
been particularly serious.  The average  annual Increase In the wholesale
price Index as a proxy for the Increase In costs for utilities gives some
Indication of the  Inflationary pressures that utilities  have had to  face.
However, not a!l of these Increases would be directly reflected In the
utilities' costs, since existing assets are not revalued In many Instances
and the full cost of oil price Increases  sometimes  have  not been passed  on
to the utility.  Average  annual rates of Inflation of over 20%  between  1973
and 1981 were encountered by about 40% of the utilitles sampled and
another  50%  experienced  rates c?  between  10-20%.  However,  the situatlon
has Improved  In the 19809  with Inflation rates  belcw 10%  for the majority of
utilities  reviewed (with some notable exceptions In  Latin America, for
example Brazil and Uruguay). Of course, If tariff  had been Increased In
line with Increased costs the Inflationary Impact on the utility would be
minimized.
Exchanae  Rates
The volatility of exchange  rates has had a particularly significant
effect on project and sector performance  during the late 19708 and 19809.
Thirty-eight  percent  of  projects  wfth  cdst  overruns  cited  currency
fluctuations as one of the reasons  for such overruns,  but these were mainly
projects Implemented  In the late 19709. The  strengthening  of the US  dollar- 77 -
In the first part of the 1980s  decade has resulted In cost underruns (with
costs expressed  In dollars) for about one third of projects. Of course, one
of the major problems of expressing  all costs In US dollars Is that nominal
costs will go up and down with the fluctuation In the US dollar which has
been quite volatile over the last few years. Now, after  the recent period of
cost underruns,  overruns  can again be expected because  of the recent tall
In the dollar which may not have  been anticipated  In project  cost estimates.
It expressed  In local currency,  the impact of cost Increases  and decreases
will look very different from the behavior of the corresponding US dollar
cost, especlally If most of the procurement  was In currencies  other than US
dollars.
Interest  Rates
The high Interest  rates  In the early 19809  has obviously  resulted In
higher debt service obligations for power utilities and was given as one of
the reasons for poor performance  by nearly one third of utiilties.  A moro
detailed study would be  required to  determine the  magnitude of  the
Increase  In debt service obligations, for they are not so readily apparent  In
those cases where tariffs were Increased In line with  Increased costs,
Including debt service.
3.2 Potentially  Controllable  Factors  In the National  Environment
The  performance of  the  power  sector could be significantly
Improved If governments  were to take certain measures  that would either
remove restrictions on the utilities' activities or Improve  coordinatlon and
planning of the sector. Such measures  are outside the control of the utility
but  completely  within  the  purview  of  government.  Government
procurement procedures are often  slow and cumbersome resulting In
delays In the award of contracts.  About one quarter of the projects with
significant delays cited slow government  procedures as one of the major
reasons for  the  delays.  There does not  appear to  have been  any- 78 a
improvement over time since the same pGrcentage  of projects are still
suffering from similar problems.  Slow bureaucratic  procedures  have also
resulted In delays In transmission projects because  of the lengthy time to
obtain  wayleaves:
Government  Interference  In  the  planning,  managerial,
financial, and day-to-day operations of the utility appears to  be a very
serious problem for a small but significant number of utilities (about 10%  In
the sample) and a moderate  but serious problem for about  25%  of utilities.
Very few variables In the study were found to be strongly correlated, but
one of the  highest correlations was between the  level of  Institutional
performance and government Interference.  As Institutional performance
weakened and the  number of  unmet Institutional Improvement targets
Increased,  the likelihood of government  Interference  became  greater. The
total  level  of  losses  (technical  and  unaccounted-for energy)  had  a
moderate  correlation  with the level of government  Interference  which Is not
unexpected,  since govemments  can put pressure on the utilities to refrain
from disconnecting those who do not pay their  bills.  In addition, the
prosecution of large numbers of people with Illegal connections  would be
politically difficuft In some countries.  There was also some relationship
between the  overall conformity with  loan covenants and govemment
Interference,  L.e.,  the less covenants  were conformed  with, the more likely
there was to be govemment  Interference  In the operations  of the utility.
The correlation between  Institutional performance  and the extent
of  government Interference cannot be  used to  demonstrate causality.
Governments  malntain that they become lnvclved In sector management,
I.e., Interfere,  because  the power utility Is weak and/or Inefficient  and such
Involvement Is desirable and necessary.  Critics contend, however, that
such Interference Is the cause of Inefficiency and poor performance  and
that management  and staff weaknesses  can be overcome  by paying better
salaries  and giving more autonomy  to the utilities.
Undoubtedly the  biggest  Impact of  governments Is  on  the
flnancial performance  of utilitles because  virtually all governments  control*79
tariff levels.  Of those utilitles which did not meet their financial targets,
about 70% cited failure to  raise tariffs  as one of the reasons for poor
performance. Slgnificantly, practically all  of  those with  good  financial
performance  gave timely tarlff Increases  as one of the major reasons. In
some cases, governments  have lacked the commitment  to reuse tariffs or
have  failed to understand  the Banks  objectives. During  the 19806,  failure to
raise tariffs  does  not  appear to  have contributed  to  poor  financial
performance  as much as the lower growth of sales (due  to the deteriorating
economic -conditions  In many countries).  The extent to which average
revenues  kept up with operating  cost Increases  was reviewed  for a sample
of projects Implemented  from 1968 to 1984. In real terms (expressed  In
local currency), average r-venues kept  up with  Increases In  average
operating costs per KWh In one half of projects studied and were even
higher In another 20%  of cases. However,  of those cases where revenue
Increases were the same as operating cost Increases, depreclatlon was
based  on the historical cost of assets  and not revalued  assets. Therefore,
In general, tariffs had not been Increased  sufficlently to keep up with the
Increased cost to  replace assets, let  alone provide for  adequate self-
financing of new Investments. Surprisingly,  tarifs  appear to have lagged
more behind operating cost Increases  during the early 1970s:  during the
1980s  more utilities have managed  to keep average  revenues In line with
operating cost Increases. However,  this doer not mean  that these utilities
are financially healthy since a substantlal  number had a low Initlal level of
performance. Factors  such as the generatlon  mix appear  to have  had little
Influence  on financial performance  Including  the operating  ratio.
3.3 Factors  Within the Utility
As  discussed  In  Sectlon  2.7  (self-financing ratio),  some
utilities have serious cash flow problems because of Inadequate  working
Japital.  The failure to provide adequate working capital results In many
utilities managing  their finances  on a hand-to-mouth  basis, because  funds
are not readily available  to pay bills and sometimes,  salarles and wages.
There are known cases  where  funds borrowed  locally, ostensibly  for capitalaso  -
projects are being used for working capital.  Such practices, which are
unacceptable,  result In project delays and higher costs. There Is a need  for
greater  analysis both  of  the  composition of  working  capital  and  to
determine working capital needs.  Contribution to investment covenants
should be based on OMS  2.22,  and where necessary,  supported by a well-
defined working capital covenant. It is also obvious  that If Bank  standards
are to be maintained,  Bank management  and staff must follow the carefully
prepared  and approved  guidelines  for financial  covenants.
The  problems that tend to be most frequently addressed  are
those  that  are  Inherent weaknesses of  utilitles  themselves.  Weak
management, poorly  qualified and Inexperienced technical staff, weak
programming and planning, poor supervision, etc, seriously affect the
performance  of the power  sector.
Procurement
One  of  the rrjajor documented weaknesses of many utilities  Is
weak procurement procedures. The extent of this weakness  Is constantly
underestimated  by the Bank, for nearly 60%  of projects with delays cited
the  utility's  slow  procurement procedures as  a  major  reason.  The
bureaucratic  process  for awarding  contracts,  delays In drawing up bidding
documents, and  mistakes  In  procurement procedures resulting  from
unfamiliarity or  disagreement with  Bank procedures often  resulted In
delays of six to twelve months.  C  e would have expected to find some
Improvement  over time as more utilities were on at least their third project
financed by the Bank.  However,  available data shows that procurement
was as much a problem In the 1980s  as In earlier periods. In a few cases,
delays were due to  new procurement or  other procedures.  In many
Instances, both  the  Bank  and the  Borrower failed  to  Identify these
constralnts early enough to Introduce mitigating measures  as part of the
project  In other cases, questionable  procurement  practices  were resisted
by the Bank, resulting In considerable  delays.-81 .
Other  Problems
About  20% of  projects  had substantial  delays because  of the
utility's  general Inefficiency, lack of control or poor judgement.  Either
consultants  were  terminated  prematurb.i, or force account  operatlons  were
poorly organized  and supervised,  or there may have  been  shortages  of staff
to administer constructlon programs. Technical problems were cited as a
reason for delays and cost overruns for about one half of the projects but
most of the problems were considered  not to have  been within the control
of the utility but were unforeseen  design and engineering  problems, such
as  additlonal  preparation works  for  construction projects  and  faulty
Installation of equipment.  Poor cost estimates which are ultimately the
responsibility  of  the  utility  (although the  Bank has ta  approve such
estimates)  was one of the reasons  for project cost overruns for about 20%
of projects. Revisions  to Drolects  was a reason  for cost overruns  for about
40%  of projects, at least  some of which were due to poor preparation  of the
original project by the u.llity. Of the Investment  programs for which there
were delays In Implementation,  about 25%  were the result of Institutional
Inability  to carry out the program.
One of  the most slgnificant correlatlons observed  was between
Institutional performance  and lvel  of losses.  The higher the losses the
noorer the Institutlonal performance. Poor  bililng systems, Inability  to read
meters correctly and In a timely fashion,  poor control of Illegal connections
and poor operatlon and maintenance  of the network  were all contributory
factors to high loss levels. Admittedly strong government  support Is often
required to Implement effective Iss  control programs,  but much can still
be done by the utility itself If It has the required  determinatlon. Overloaded
distrbutlon  systems also account for substantial losses but many of the
systems are overloaded  because of Illegal connectlons and failure of the
utility to control the growth of new connectlons.
Soine  recent  statistical  analysis  In  EGY to  determine the
relationship between technical and financlal performance,  yielded mixed
results.  Institutlonal performance  was measured  by the overall efficiency-82-
of the entity (Section  2.8), adequacy  of maintenance,  and loss levels,  while
financial performance  was based on Indicators such as the rate of return,
level of self-financing, debt service and operatirg  ratio.  These results
suggest that entitles with poor institutional performance  generally tend to
also have poor financial performance. However,  there are some entities
with poor firancial  performance but demonstrating reasonable  technical
and institutlonal performance. The technical Indicator  that does appear  to
be most correlated  with financial Ind!cators  Is the level of losses. Utilities
wlth high losses also tend to 6ave  high receivables from customers and
poor operating ratios and the greater the deterioration In the financial
performance of utilities, the more likely that losses have also Increased
over time.
Increased receivables  was given as one of the reasons  for poor
financial performance  by 30%  of utilities.  High receivables  are due In part
to a  weak Institution since failure to collect from customers Indicates a
poorly  administered billing  system.  However, high  receivables are
frequently due to failure of government  agencies  to pay their bills, a matter
which Is completely outside  the control  of the utility.-83-
IV. ISSUES.  OPTIONS.  AND  RECOMMENDATIONS
4.1 Issues  Arising from the Retrospective  Review
One Important  finding of this survey confirms the general bellef
that developing countries have made  great strides In Improving access to
electricity but, with  some notable exceptions, have not  had as much
success In Improving power sector and project performance. The study
results also show that project Implementation  and financial performance
have  been  progressively deteriorating  or  have shown  little  or  no
Improvement over  the  last  20  years,  despite  the  fact  that  Project
Performance  Audit Reports  (PPARs)  have  generally shown  most projects  to
be economically justified at completion.  Speclfic problems such as the
need for better cost estimates have been recognized and addressed In
annual Project Implementation Reviews (PIRs), but the sector does not
appear to be making significant Improvements  In performance. The Bank
has also attempted  to deal with the problems through the preparation of
sector  and  Individual  country  strategies  and  other  Internal reviews.
Keeping  In mind the amount of efort which has already gone Into dealing
with  Issues, the options and recommendations  presented here cannot
provide Instant solutions.  Rather, they are Intended to provoke further
thought on possible strategies and help In reorlenting the focus of the
power sector towards broader energy sector ad macroeconomic  linkages
rather than focussing  narrowly  on traditional project Issues.
Another principal conclusion of this study Is that both the Bank
and its Borrowers  are over optimistic In most aspects  of project design  and
Implementation Including demand forecasting, project  Implementation,
financial performance,  loss reduction, and the level of maintenance  to be
achieved. With  the exception  of cost estimates,  the actual  results  at project
completion have been less than forecast for all the Indicators of project
performance. Given the available  evidence  from this study, there appears
to be little likelihood that sector and project performance  would Improve
significantly unless changes  are made  to the Bank's and Borrowers'  basic
approach  to oower  sector  operations.- 84  -
There  are several factors which contribute to this conclusion.
First, forecasts are often seen In part as targets with a certain expectation
that they will not be met.  In many countries there Is a need to aim high In
order to  lay claim to  funds from the development budget; hence, high
growth rate  forecasts  are welcomed  as a justification  to allocate more  funds
to the sector than would otherwise be granted. While  a sensitivity analysis
of the effects of reduced demand  and higher costs Is routinely carried out
by the Bank In connection with the economic evaluation of projects, only
recently (1987)  has i  become a requirement  to carry out similar sensitivity
analyses  as part of the financial  or engineering  evaluations.
Within the Bank there Is an understandable  pressure  to meet the
lending program. There Is also a reluctance at each stage In the project
cycle to cause delays In loan processing.  The natural tendency Is to
advance to  the  next step  In order  to  maintain momentum In project
preparation or Implementation and thereby meet the usually very tight
schedules.  Only In hindsight Is It possible to assess whether or not a
single  Issue was sufficient  justification  to  delay  processing, suspend
negotiations  or whatever. It Is not surprising therefore  that targets are not
met,  The Inevitable  result, however, Is often a somewhat  fatalistic If not
cynical expectation  on the part of staff that the results will not be achieved.
There  Is also a consequent  loss of credibility of the Bank by the Borrowers.
Basic  questions  should  be  posed  and  better addressed,
conceming the standards  that are set for each utility and the feasibility of
meeting them.  Perhaps more significantly one should  ask what the
consequences  are of not meeting demand forecasts, financial covenants,
lose reduction targets, etc.  Would the loan still  be justified In terms of
Institution building or In sustaining  the sector so that electricity supply can
be maintained to  existing productive sectors?  Does the loan provide
leverage  with regard  to sector and macroeconomic  Issues?
The optlons which are within the control of the Bank relate to the
Instruments  at Ns  disposal and the leverage  which It has at different levels.
The Bank does not have much leverage  In large countries or where project-85-
loans  are small  relative to  total  Investment In the  power  sector  and the
economy  as a whole.  Effective options  In different  countries  will  range
from  specific  Items  In project  design,  design  of  loan  covenants, sector
lending by tranches with conditlons,  or broadly based policy  lending with
varying degrees of Importance depending on the Issue and the country.
Project composition and the mix of Investment among generation,
transmission,  and  distribution  can be  Influenced  by the  Bank  but these
matters are ultimately under the control of the government.  The results of
this study, however, suggest that there has been a relative lack of support
by the  Bank for subtransmission  and distribution  Investment.  During the
period  1965-1980, the average composition  of Bank lending was 58% for
generation, 22% for transmission,  9% for distribution,  and  11% for  other
components.  Investment  In distribution  plant typically  Is of the order  of
30% of total and, In the absence of Bank participation, utilitles  have sought
other sources which have less concern for the overall sector or have made
piecemeal and often substandard extensions to the distributlon  networks.
The result  over the long term has been high  losses and a poor quality of
service.
rhere  arr,  of  course,  many  factors  other  than the Bank's
Involvement that will contribute to, or detract from, the outcome of projects.
These factors  are  examined  below  In terms  of their  susceptibillty  to  be
controlled  at various stages and at different  levels Interventlon.  These
factors may be (I) entirely exogenous  and beyond the Influence of either
the country or the Bank, (II) within the purview of the national government
and the national economy and perhaps largely a matter of political  will to
control,  and (III) within the control and management of the power sector as
presently  constituteil  or If given  the  autonomy  to act  as  required.
Exoaenous Factors
The state  of  the  world  economy  Is the  obvious  major  external
factor  which  must  be taken Into  account  In the project  design  but  which Is
not controllable  by the government  or utility. The  world economy  In the-86-
19705  and 1980s  hs  been  more volatile and hence,  more difficult to predlet
especially since the oll crisis.  The cyclical effects are difficult to Identify
until they are well established. For Instance,  as oil prices were Increasing
rapidly after 1979  there was little expectation  of the stagnation  In prices by
1982 followed by a  complete reversal of  prices by  1986. The 1982-84
recession led  to  much  lower civil  works contracts for  projects  now
underway. While  this situation will change  again,  there will be an Inevitable
lag as the required adjustments  are made  to base cost estimates to reflect
the changed market conditions.  Conditions of International Inflation are
more systematically  dealt with by EPD In terms of the Manufacturing  Unit
Value Index relating to  goods shipped from industrlalized countries to
developing  countries.
While Inflation  can be taken Into account  In project costs and loan
amounts, there will remain the need for assessing Inflation effects on the
revaluation  of assets.  A further review of revaluation  methods Is warranted
to account for both local and International  Inflation as It affects the fixed
asset base of power utilities ane the Impact  this would have on operating
costs and, hence,  tariff requirements.
There Is obviously not much that can be done to Influence the
extemal factors themselves. To a limited extent the Bank can work at the
macroeconomic  level (where i  has leverage)  to persuade  governments  to
adopt economic policies that do  not aggravate the effects of  extemal
factors.  These policies would relate to matters such as exchange rates,
local Interest rates and fuel prices and would have a fundamental  bearing
on  pricing.  The  Bank  and  Borrowers should  also  adopt  a  less
deterministic, more scenario-oriented approach that Is better suited to
dealing  with uncertainty.
The  variabillty  of  funding  available  to support development
projects In each country has also become a significant factor.  There has
been a shiftlng not only of the level of support from year to year but also a
shifting emphasis among sectors, e.g. agriculture, urban, energy, and
Industry have all  been considered as requirlng particular emphasis at-87-
different times.  There is  a tendency among the  international funding
agencies  to shift priloritles  all at the same time from sector to sector and
within the power sector.  in this circumstance, It would be desirable to
assess the rate of growth which can be supported In the power  sector and
the priorities for expansion (generation,  transmission, and/or distribution)
In the light of available  funding.
Factors  Controllable  at the National  Level
(a) Tarifs and Pricing
The poor financial state of utilities as discussed previously Is In
large part due to the failure of government  to permit timely and sufficient
tariff Increase. This problem Is reflected directly by deteriorating  operating
ratios.  As  a  result,  many  utilitles  are  dependent on  government for
contributions to Investment,  preferentlal  Interest rates,  the walving of debt,
subsidized Interest rates, and contributions to operatlons In a few cases.
Governments  have a reluctance to Increase  tarifs  In times of Inflation or
recession. Even If tariff adjustment  formulas  exist they may not be applied,
especlally In  countries where economic conditlons have deteriorated.
There can be no solution to this problem In the absence  of government  will
and/or Bank  leverage  to ensure  that tarlff action  Is taken as required.
The Importance  of sound power  sector pricing policles Is part of
the overall Issue  pf pricing In many  countries. It will be difficult, however,
to obtain compliance with tariff covenants  If a government  does not share
the Bank's views on the overall need for economic efficiency pricing in
general.  There Is  Increasing realization that  In  many countries, the
efficiency, resource mobilization and social  equlty  objectives are not
Inconsistent, and can be  met by  raising the average price level and
Improving  the structure of tarifs.- 88  -
(b)  Revaluation  of Assets
About 40%  of countries have formally Instituted a policy of asset
revaluation which  leads to  a  realistic provision for  depreciation as a
component  of operating costs. The remaining 60%  of countries either do
not  revalue assets or  do  so  partially  or  Inconsistently leading to  an
understatement of  costs  and, therefore, of  tariff  requirements.  Many
governments are  concerned,  however, that  asset  revaluation would
contribute to Inflation and that historical cost accounting should continue
to be the basis for determining costs.  As this Is a fundamental  Issue In
accounting practice and pricing policy it would need  to be dealt with by the
government as  It  cannot be addressed directly from within the power
sector.
1lc)  Allocatlon of Funds  to the Power  Sector
The  rate  of  expansion of the sector depends directly on the
allocation of Investment  funds by government  through the usual five year
plan as well  as through annual allocatlons from development budgets.
Increasingly In LAC, S.Asla, and In Africa there Is a lack of counterpart
funds to  support otgolng  projects let alone embark on new ones.  In
additlon, there Is very often a lack of foreign exchange  for spares  and, In a
number of cases, fuel for regular operation.  This problem Is, of course, not
unique  to the power sector; however,  It Is clear In such circumstances  that
govemments  place higher (perhaps  justified) priority on other sectors. The
Issue Is then fundamental  - can the country afford to continue expanding
the power sector at the currently planned pace?  If not, what should be the
priorities within ths sector?
(d)  Procurement
The procurement procedures of  government have affected all
sectors;  for  the  power  zector  about  one  quarter  of  projects  have
experienced  delays  because of  slow  and  cumbersome government
procedures. The problem can only be dealt with at government  level, not- 89 -
within the power sector; however, there Is often an Implicit assumption that
changes In procedures can be agreed and Implemented by the power utillty
when, In reality, such changes are far more difficult  to Implement because
of considerable vested Interests In existing procedures.
(e)  Management Appointments
In  virtually  all  countries,  senior  managers  and  often  middle
managers are appointed or approved by government.  A previous study of
power  utility  performance  showed  the  quality  of  leadership  and
management  to  be  the  single  most  significant  factor  leading  to  good
performance.  An  Important  Issue arises  If competent  managers are  not
available and/or  existing  managers cannot be changed.  The Bank must
then  consider  and  modify  sector  objectives  accordingly.  Consideratlon
must  be  given  to  the  time  required  for  Institutional  adjustments  since
changing  management  will  not  result  In  Immediate  Improvements  In
performance.
(f)  Autonomy of the Utility
In addition  to the  appointment  of managers, governments  have
direct control  over the autonomy of the utilities.  In many cases, autonomy
is  purely  nominal  with  most  real  control  remaining  vested  In  the
government.  Govemments are reluctant to relinquish this control when the
quality  of service  Is poor,  operations  are  Inefficient,  and management Is
perceived as weak.  The government may, of course, be responsible In part
by  failing  to  permit  adequate  salaries  which  cannot  attract  or  hold
competent  staff.  Attempts  at  institutlon  building  through  training  are
thwarted by the departure of staff once trained.
It Is clear that governments will not grant more autonomy without
some  assurance of  Improvements  In efficiency  and sector  performance.
The concept  of  a contract  plan  between the government  and  utility  was
used  successfully  In France for  many years, and  has also been trieC In
several countries  such as Ivory Coast and Senegal.  In this  approach  the0o  -
setting of policy objectives Is done by the government  In consultation  with
the utility's senior management,  who then are accountable  and responsible
for Implementing  these policles. In return, Increased  autonomy  and control
of resources Is given to the utility.  Thus the roles of the utility and the
government  are spelled out; however,  the ultimate  success of the contract
plan depends on its realism and the willingness and ability of both sides to
adhere  to the contract.
Factors  Within the Utility
The degree of autonomy  enjoyed by the utility wlil determine  the
number  of  factors  and  extent  to  which  they  are  controllable  or
Inflienceable by it.  The principal Items which are generally controllable
are (a) day to day operations, (b) metering,  collection, and billing, and (c)
accounts receivable.  Given the control which most governments  have of
the sector Investment  budgets, and frequently, the operating budgets of
utilities, these items can only be Influenced by the utilities through the
planning and budgeting process.
External  factors may again predotermine  the extent of control of
the utility since foreign exchange  shortages  may not permit optimum plant
operation because  of lack of spares or shortage  of fuel.  Receivables  may
Increase because the governments  themselves do not pay their bills or
delinquent  customers  cannot  be  prosecuted  or  disconnected.  A
recognition of the degree of  control which the utility  has to  meet the
covenants  Is required before  realistic covenants  can be drawn up.
4.2 Options and Recommendations
A sound power  sector  pricing policy whereby  timely and  sufficlient
tariff  Increases are Implemented  Is usually cited as a major solution for
Improving the poor financial situation of many utilities In many borrowing
countries.  The  Bankt and  its  Borrowers have traditionally agreed on
financial  goals,  Including  tariff  Increases, In  loan  covenants.  The-91 -
commitment  of borrowers  to these  covenants  can easily be questioned  as It
Is found that over halt of the borrowers  did not conform to the covenants
requiring tariff Increases  to meet targeted rates of return or self-financing
ratios.  Even  when there was conformity,  this was frequently attained only
at the end of the project when there was a condition of effectiveness  for a
follow-on project.  It appears, then, that It would be necessary to have
follow-on prQjects  to ensure leverage and successive  tranches could be
released  to ensure compliance. This could be successful  for transmission
and distribution projects but would not be practical for large generation
projects where an assurance of financing Is essential to  carry out the
project at minimum cost.
Leverage Is a particular problem for the Bank In some of the
larger countries.  in these Instances  tl 3 Bank has only two options - to
reduce or stop lending, or to continue lending In order to  maintain Its
dialogue with the anticipation of an eventual Influence on pollcy In the
power  sector.
The problem of leverage can be addressed at the sector level
whereby larger loans could be made available as lines of credit for any
component  of an agreed upon Investment  program. More leverage  would
be expected  with larger loans. This outcome could be expected,  however,
only In the case of smaller countries.  One remaining course Is to tie
performance on  matters such as pricing  and procurement (which are
common  to several  sectors),  to policy-based  lending operations.
Failure of govemments  to Increase  tariffs when required Is often
cited  as  a  reason for  poor  fIrtenclal performance of  many  utilitles.
However, NIs may be an over-simplifled explanation because there are
other contributing factors relating to costs which need greater attentlon.
These factors Include high losses, high debt service leading  to a low debt
service coverage ratio,  and too  rapid  sector  expansion which  Is  not
affordable,  leading to yet higher debt service requirements. As a result of
these  factors,  Intemal cash generation has been  Insufficient to  meet
lnvestmpen  rp't  ulrwntp  which In turn has led to poor maintenance  and-92  -
service quality.  Those Is also generally a much higher need for working
capital than has been considered In the calculation ot the self-financing
ratio In financial projections.
More analysis of recurrent costs needs to be undertaken  as part
of sector planning In addition to the detailed evaluation of the least cost
Investment program that Is carried out at appraisal.  The Imbalance In
sector Investment  and underfunding of distribution In many oases has led
to a deterioration In service quality and an Increase  In losses. A reduction
In losses would obviously  reduce costs as well as Increase  revenues.
There Is a need for Bank staff to llmit their Involvement In the
actual planning of projects In borrowing countries.  It has been observed
that there Is a tendency for the Bank  to provide greater Input  throughout  the
project cycle due to the lack of planning capabilities In many countries.
Such Involvement Is oftegi necessary as there Is neither continuity nor
sufficient transfer of skills In the conduct of planning studies  to provide for
the  required  In-house capability.  Bank staff  frequently provide this
continuity, particularly at the time of appraisal; however,  there would be a
danger that the Bank  would lose its objectivity In the process If It becomes
too closely Involved.
Many of the findings of this study which relate  to broad sector
Issues  focus on questions  of priorities within the power  sector and In some
cases  to the priority of the power  sector within the economy  as a whole. It
has been a generally held view that electricity Is essential for economic
development  and that expressed  demand  should be satisfied as rapidly as
possible.  Given the evidence of the last two decades, i  Is apparent  that
Issues should not necessarily  be assessed  In terms of a demand  forecast
but rather In terms of supply conditlons.  Where quality of service has
declined and losses have not been reduced then there should be more
emphasis  on  maintenance and  rehabilitation  and  less  on  service
expansion.  Sector expansion must be geared to  affordability given the
highly capital Intensive  nature of the power  sector. Much  greater  emphasis
on  broader  energy  planning  and  analysis  of  Intersectoral  and-93 .
macroeconomic linkages Is needed to ensure that all supply constraints
are adequately  considered In sector development. These factors Include
not only forelgn and local funding availability but also management  and
professional staff  capability for  all  aspects of  system operatlon and
development.
The  Bank  has  Increasingly supported  Investment planning
studies.  However,  these have tended to focus on long term generatlon
planning  or the preparation  of the next project. There Is a need  to broaden
the scope of the studies to Include subtransmission  and distribution In
detail  as  requirements for  ongoing operatlons and maintenance, and
manpower  Jevelopment.  If the sector plan reveals  that there Is a constraint
In a particular area  which cannot  be resolved  from within the power sector,
then the planning  forecast should be adjusted  to stay within the bounds of
the constraint  In m3ny countries, the primary constraint will  be the
percentage  of total GDP  that should be allocated  to the sector.
Assuming a greater emphasis  on Improving  the efficiency of the
utilitles, there Is a need  to determine  why some countries  such as Thailand,
Korea, Tunisia, and Malawi have successfully Increased  their efficiency,
while repeated  projects In other countries have  met with little success. It
does appear  that macroeconomic  conditions have  a strong bearing on the
likelihood of success. If the government  Is following uneconomic  policies
and the national administratlon  Is generally  weak and Inetficient, then It Is
unlikely  that  the  power  utility  will  succeed  In  making  significant
Improvements  In performance.
Given  the  lncreasing climate of uncertalnty which affects all
aspects of  planning and performance, It Is essential to  go beyond the
simple deterministic approach based on expected values, by evaluating
different scenarios  and paying  greater  attentlon  to risk analysis.  At the level
of project preparation,  this Includes  risk analysis  with regard  to the effects
of uncontrollable  or uncertain  fantors  on:-94 -
-demand  forecast
- project costs
- economic justificatlen  of the project
-financial  performance  -debt service
- required  tariff Increases,
e.g. fuel adjustment  clauses
- avall bility of funds  for the project
At the sector level, there Is a need  to constantly  review  the power
sector  Investnent  program where Internatlonal and national economic
conditions are changing rapidly. In particular, there Is a need to review
demand forecasts (in 60% of cases where actual demand was below the
forecast, one of the reasons  cited was poor macroeconomic  conditlons). If
there were large Increases  In costs in general and not just for the project,
would the Investment program as planned still be justified?  If so, would
local and foreign exchange  funds be available? Risk analysis In this sense
Is seen  as being more extensive  than  the simple form of sensitivity analysis
normally carried out at appraisal. This Is the sort of analysis that a well
establishAd utility would undertake as part of Its medium and long term
planning.
Finally,  for the Bank itself, there Is a need  for a grea!er realism  In
setting  performance targets.  PPARs are  Intended to  focus  on  the
performance  of  a  single  project  to  assess  whether  the  Individual
Invest.ment  was justified and whether  It was Implemented  as planned. With
this narrow focus, It Is not surprising that the overall trends In the power
sector of a country are not reflected. The present focus, however  reduces
the usefulness of the data which are available from the PPARs  as It Is
difficuit to get an accurate assessment  over time of the power sector In
Individual countries In order to determine trends and causal factors.  The
statistical analysis of the Bank's historical Involvement  Is becoming more
difficuit as the number of prolects Is  Increasing and the data become more
difficult  to  retrieve and  manipulate.  It  Is  recommended that  greater
attention  be given to the collection and maintenance  of a data base  that will
serve both audit and operatlonal  needs.905-
In addition to Improving  the accessibility of data,  there Is a need
for a more conslstent applicatlon  of the OMS definitlons of financial ratios
as well as more attention given to quality control.  In many cases,  figures
presented  were  ambiguous;y  defined  In  documents  and  a  full
understanding  of the situation  was not possible.
The need  for quality control of SARs  also remains  high. SARs  are
the  principal  document  and  used  constantly  throughout  project
Implementatlon  and provide significant Information  for the Borrowers  and
their consultants  as well.
Specific  recommendations for  Improving project  and  sector
performance  are summarized  as follows:
1.  systematically examine optlons for sector restructuring, In order to
strengthen  market forces, Improve  the environment  In which the utility
functions,  and Increase  Incentives  for enhanced  utility efficiency;
2.  place  greater emphasis on  Improving productive efficiency, with
special  reference to  malntenance, rehabilitation, and  distributlon
network Investments,  In order to  Improve losses and the quality of
service;  measuring productive efficiency can only be achieved by
developing more systematic collection and analysis of performance
indlcators;
3.  strengthen  the analysis  of power-energy-macroeconomic  linkages,  and
pay more attentlon to project evaluation In the sectoral and national
economic context. In particular, assess the feasibility of the sector
Investment  program and the ability of the sector and government  to
finance  the program;
4.  In determining Investment  and pricing policy, adopt less deterministic
tnalytical  approaches that  can  better  account  for  the  greater
uncertainties  in  the current environment. Also carry out a more In-
depth rlsk and sensitivity analysis of the Impact of poor project anda96-
stor  performance In the forn  of "what It'  questlons, as part of the
financial evaluation  to be undertaken  during project preparation  and as
part of sa6tor work (rather  than at appralial);
S.  ensure that sufficient Investment planning has been carried out to
asses  the  relative Importance of  rehabilitation and reinforcement
compared  with  generation  and transmlsslon capacity  expansion.
Maintain a balance  In lending to ensure  that all parts of the system can
be uniformly develope';
6  adopt more realistic targets with respect to pflysical and especially
financial performance,  and identlfy more clearly and specMcaily the
constraInt to meeting  such targets.-97 -
ANNEX  I
SOURCES  OF DATA  FOR  REVIEW  OF
POWER  PROJECT  AND  SECTOR  PERFOMANCE
A.1 Data  Sources
About 300 projects have been financed by the World Bank and
IDA (henceforth,  reference  to "World Bank" will include IDA projects) from
1965-83  of which about 95%  were completed by the end of FY 1986. The
year 1983 has been taken as the cut-off date in order to Include In this
review only projects that have been completed or have had at least three
years of Implementation  experience. Altogether,  data were collected from
a  variety of sources and analyzed  for 123 completed projects approved
mainly between  1967-1978  and Implemented  between  t967-1982. (See A.3
for  list  of  projects). Data on projects approved In 1965 and 1966 and
completed before 1972  were not generally available  because  project audit
reports were only prepared  for projects completed In 1972  and thereafter.
The sources of data used In the stud- were project appraisal, completion
and audft reports.  (Henceforth, to  simplify definitions the term "audit
report" will  be used throughout the study to Include project completion
reports  which have  not been  audited  but have  been officially released  from
the  Regions).  Audit/project completion reports are available for  159
projects; however,  time constraints, data anomalies,  and other problems
restricted  the detailed  analysis  to 123  projects.
.
Date  collection for the review  was divided Into two parts. The flrst
part Included compilation of data for several Indicators, such as project
cost overruns  and delays,  financial ratios,  cumulative  disbursements,  sales
and losses, and Institutional performance  for the 123 completed projects
Included  In the study.
an  the whole, the regional representation  of the 123  projects Is
fairly good, with the exception of S. Asla (Table  Al).  The number of audit-98  -
reports available for S. Asia Is quite limited and Is far below the actual
percentage  of total projects represented  by that region. In particular,  there
are very few evaluations of completed Indian power projects. which is
unfortunate In view of the severe  financial problems which so many of the
state utilities In India  face today.
The second part of data collection focussed  on (i) a sample of 50
projects randomly selected from the population of completed projects and
(11) a  sample  of  20  projects  approved between  X  979-1983, whether
completed or not.  For the first sample detailed information  was obtained
concerning reasons for cost or time overruns, financial and Institutional
performance  and departure  from sales forecasts, as well as on the level of
government  Interference,  selected  financial Indicators  and tariff structures.
Data from the  annual Project Implementation and Supervision Review
reports (PIRs)  were used In this study to compare  the results of projects In
the 1980s  with that of the 1970s. However,  given the problems with PIRs
(Section 3.2), an additional small sample of 20 projects was taken from
those projects approved between 1979-1983  and under Implementation
during the 1980s.  Most of these projects were not completed as of 1986,
but there has been sufficient Implementation  time to compare appraisal
expectations  with actual results, particularly regarding project costs, time
delays and financlal performance.  Most of the data was obtained from the
latest supervision reports, except for  the  few  cases where a  project
completion report was available.  In addition, data was taken from EGY
reports which reviewed  ongoing projects (with data  taken from supervislon
reports) on a periodic basis up until 1984.
In order to gain some Indicatlon  of trends over a longer time span
than the period under review,  the findings of this study were  compared  with
that of an OED study carried out In 1972.  The OED  study reviewed  ten
power companies which were the recipients of 39 Bank loans between
1950-1968.  These  loans  represented  about  40%  of  total  power
disbursements  during that period. Most of the companles  studied were by
OED In Latin America but this was representative  of the regional profile
then prevailing, as about two thirds of power loans were r  ;de to  Latin
America  during that period.-99 -
Other data sources from which limited data was drawn were the
Energy Department 1982 Power Data Sheets, a book describing Bank
experience  In the power  sector (mostly dealing with the Bank's policy and
role In the  Iower  sector), and a recent revlew  of power  sector performance
Indicators.
TABLE  Al
Realonal  Comoarlson  of Prolects  Aporoved  and
Number  of PPARs  Durlna  Studv  Period.  FY1965  - 1983
S. Asia  E.  Asia  EMENA  W.  Af.  E.  At.  LAC  Total
No: of
projects
approved  35  52  61  24  28  102  302
%%oftotal  12  17  20  8  9  34  100
No ofPPARS  10  27  38  14  13  57  159
% oftotal  6  17  22  9  9  37  100
PPARs  as
% of total
projects  29  52  62  58  46  56  53
p/  H. Collier, Develoolna  Electric Power: Thirty Years of Bank
Exoerlence  Johns  Hopkins  Univ.  Press,  Baltimore,  MD,  1984.
A.2  Quality  of Data  Sources
(I  Appralsal Reports
In  general, the  appraisal  reports carried  far  more  detailed
Information than did the audit reports.  However,  there were ctill some
serlous dabt gaps In the appraisal reports, especlally the earlier ones.
Dlsbursemnent  schedules  were not Included  until the early 1970s,  therefore- 100 -
comparisons  of projected and actual  disbursements  have  not been  made  In
the audits reports for the earlier projects.  Details of proposed project
financing were generally not given In appraisal reports until later in the
1970s  and there was little reference  to levels of overall Investment  program
financing for the years leading up to appraisal;  the latter could not even be
estimated from source and application of funds statements since such
statements generally referred to  projectlons and Included no details of
funding over thb past few years.  Many of the appraisal reports did not
Include  forecasts of such basic Items as generation,  losses, peak demand
or Installed  capacity. Details  of efficiency Indicators  such as consumers/
employee  were also not Included  In many  reports.
Despite the  OMS guldelines on definitions of financial ratios,
appraisals (and audits) are not consistent In the way In which such ratios
are estimated. Furthermore,  the definitlon of the ratio as used In the SAR
(or PPAR) Is frsquently not given.  The ratio with the most Inconsistent
definition from one report to another Is the self-financing ratio, so that
direct Intercountry  comparisons  are not very meaningful. Most frequently,
Internally generated  funds do not Include any allowance  for Increases  or
decrease$ In working  capital and often working capital Increases are
Included  in investment  program  requirements. If the adjustment  Is made  to
intemally  generated funds  to  allow  for  working  capital changes, an
originally  estimated self-financing ratio  of  15-20% can easily become
negative.
Audit ReDorts
Project completion reports have  been prepared  for the majority  of
projects completed since 1972.  Many of these projects have also been
audited  which means  that OED  has carried out Its own review  of the project.
The  findings of OED  are Included  In an audit report which also Includes  the
original project completion  report.-101  -
Some of the problems encountered  In using the audit reports as
data  sources are  given below:
(I)  actual  financing  of the project  Is often not given,
(li)  the  extent  to  which  the  original  Investment program  (of
which  the  project  was  a  part)  was  Implemented Is  usually
not given,
(111)  an  assessment of  the  performance of  the  utility  Is  often
no$ given In  any depth, especially regarding operations and
maintenance  and overall  efficiency,
(iv)  reasons for higher or lower than projected sales are not given In
some reports,
(v)  the adequacy  of planning  Is not discussed  In most reports,
(vi)  lack of Information  on generation,  losses, peak demand,  Installed
capacity, reliability of serV  nd breakdown  of consumption  at
the time of project completu...
The  earlier  audits  also  contained  no  data  sheets  and  no
disbursement  profile. Even  such standardized  data as financial statements
are not Included In all audits; for example,  out of the 50 audits reviewed In
the  sample survey, seven had no  balance sheets (which meant that
receivables could not estimated) and five had no funds flow statements
(which meant that the debt service and self-financing ratlos could not be
estimated, nor govemment  contributlon to construction).  Implementatlon
schedules broken down by project component  were also absent  from many
report*
Many  of the audits  for projects In certain Latin  American  countries
compared appralsal and actual project costs In constant  prices of the year
of appraisl  which Is understandablo  In a  astuation  of rampant Inflation.
However,  In the comparlson  the reports have often not removed  the price
contingencl  Included In the  appralsal cost estimates to  bring those
prices Into constant terms.  As a result, there Is an underestimate  of cost
overruns In these cases.-102  -
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Credit  LGua I  Report  Aoproval
h1ber  Credit l  er  Region  Project  Title  Data
0113  aI  Credit  1561  NAP  Ghaa  First  Electricity  Corporation  of  haa  (EC6)  powr  11Jun-68
0165  la  Credit  2741  AEP  Indonesia  - First  Electricity  Distribution  21-Oct-69
01713  1  Crd4it  645  EAP  Nalavi  Tediani  Stage  I Hydroelectric  27-Jan-70
0213  PA  Credit  3410  ASP  Pakistan  - First  M9A  Powr  12-Aug-70
0227  ES  Credit  K62  LCP  El Salvador  - Fifth  Pur  12-Jan  71
0242111  Credit  3006  ASP  (ndia  - Second  Poer  Tranuission  27-Apr-71
0216  EC  Credit  3003  LCP  Ecuador  - Third  Powr  01-Feb-72
0334  1I  Credit  2741  AEP  Idond  ia  - Second  Electricity  Distribution  02-JW72
0372  CE  Crdit  3711  ASP  Sri Lots - Fifth Pour  05-Apr-7'
0377  IN  Credit  ASP  India Powr  Tranion  [II  26-Feb-73
036  JO  Credit  387S  EI Jordan-  First  Hisin Therml  Powr  22n -713
03" IN  Credit  5104  ALP  Indonesia  - Third  Pour  22-Jim-73
0403  a  Lon  2370  LCP  Brail - Estreito  Powr  - Gnration  2S-Feb-65
0426  SI  Credit  2116  EAP  Nalawi  - SecoW  Poer  04-Sw-73
0433  1  Credit  2733  LCP  oliviia-  Third  E  nprea  cional  d Electricidad  (RIEE)  Power  29-Aug-13
04U7  7  Loan  153  LCP  Bruil - Por Distribution  13-Dec-6
047g  it  Loa  856  LCP  Brail - Powr  Distribution  13-Dec-6
04179  C  Lon  1603  LCP  Chile  - Fifth Poer  22-Dac- 
0437  W1  Loan  625  LCP  Guatsla  - First  Powr  19-Jan-67
0491  PH  Loan  90  AEP  Philippine  - Fourth  Powr  04-Apr-67
0503  SI  Loan  749  AEP  Sinwore  - Pour  Distribution  (Part  1)  27-Jun-67
0511  PF  Loan  86  LCP  Peru  -latucaa  Por  07-SeP-67
0522  SU  Loan  1169  EAP  Sudan  - Roeire  Pour  09-Jan-68
0537  CO  Loam 1654  LCP  ColoWia  - Third  Expuion  EEER  UBl
0553  1  Loan  1610  P Sierra  Le  - Second  Pour  30-Jul  -6
0564=  Credit  5396  EAP  Sudan-  Secod  Poer'  22-ma-  75
05S  6  Leo  2370  LCP  Brazil  - Porto  COlWdia  Pour  15-Oct-61
0566  a  Loan  152  LCP  Brazil  - Volt  Grande  Hdolectric  15-Oct-61
0570  J0  Crdit  375  EN  Jordan  - Second  Ikssin  Therul  Por  09-Jun-75
osn  in  Credit  6307  AV  India  - Firt  bural  Electrification  30-Jun-75
0574  OIa  Loa  140  AEP  Taiu - Tachion  hot  26-Nov-68
0577  A  Lm  35  LCP  Arwetla  - El Omacon  Powr  17-Dec-63
0579  N  er  774  AEP  Nalasi -Fourth  Powr  07-Jan-69
0591  IDE'  Lm  L  M  ENlrelan  -Pu  W  edStorm  Powr  18-Nar-69
O059  Sl  Lew  749  AEP  Siqaere  - Poer  Distribution  (Part  1)  '2-2Ar-69
0596  Ea  Le  1102  LAP  Ethiopia  Fira  H  rlctric  06-Na,-t9
0600  ISP  Credit  6177  ASP  Npl - Kul*ai Hydro  23-Dec-75
0613  6C  Loan  1363  A 6ha - Secend  Volta  livr  Authority  (VIA)  Powr  03-Jun-69
0627  f  Credit  3496  4  AfghAfistan  - First  Poer  04  my-76
0631  C  Lon  760  ECP  Cost  Rica  - Third  Poer  J-Jul -69
063  CE  Loa  3710  ASP  Sri  LMiI - Fourth  Power  22-Jul-69
064 l  Loa  1055  LCP  Argetina  - Third  Servicis  Electricos  del  ran  Beo Air" (SE66A)  Pour  07-Oct-69
0645  N  Creit  3265  .CP  Kaiti  - First  Powr  17-Jun-76
0m CT  Loan  819  EM  Cyprus  - Third  Powr  I3-Oec-69
05  NE  Loa  59  LCP  keico - Third  Pour  Sector  Progra  24-Feb-70
0661  PM  Lo  2501  LCP  Pans - Second  Pour  (Baya)  10-ar-10
o6n  oA  LOH  1403  AEP  Tiwa - Second  Pour  2-4pr-70
06773  LOa  2763  LCP  Brail  - Naridondo  Pour  19-may-10
061  CO  Loan  2720  LCP  Coloebia  Chiver  Hydroelectric  :6-AY-  10-103 -
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068  L  Lao  551  NI  P Liberia First  Poewr  .o.70
06m  ml  Credit  459  LAP  Nalsi - 1kula  Falls  11  - Hydro  29-May-70
0106  a  Lou  2644  ALP  Nalaysis  - Fifth  Poer  -Mlul-10
0701  ZA  Loi  4661  EAP  Zambia  -Kariba  Nrth  Hydroelectric  05  Jul  th
o0s TA  Lao  2765  CAP  Tiniaisi Kidaty  Hydroelectric  (Fint Stage)  XtDc.70
07  116  1  Lon  3131  ENP  lslasic ePslic  of Iran tewin  Psrm  Distribetim  271-t-70
01A3  11  Lou  2709  LUC  Bruil  Salto  Osorio  Adroelectric  30M-llu71
0734  9.  Credit  4525  W Sierra  Low  - third  Poer'  1l Ju171
0717  Po  Lou  2617  AEP  P  a he  WMin  Upper  NM  Hydroelectric  15  r-7l
014f  i  Lou  1230  EAP  Kela  - Kauru  Hydroelectric  01-JO  m-71
0714  Cm  Lou  268  AEP  raivin  Third  Posr  21-Aw-71
01m)  TV  Lou  3695  Cl  turkey  - TEE  Poewr  Tr  aisimn  S-Jm-ll
0715  TV  Lou  13J2  Ew turke - Fewth  Cukuroas  Poer  29-Jime-l
07  La  Lou  1551  W Liberia- Secon  Poer  22-Jim-71
Om TN  Lmou  1966  AE thailad  - South  SanOok  Thermal  tMit  o. 4  26-ct-in
0m3  IN  Crdit  ASP  IndiA  - Korba  Thermal  l1-Apr-71
06W  Cl  Lou  2969  lC Costa  Rica  - Furth Poer  IS-Fe12
0O6  1N  Lou  2760  EN Irelad - Third  Por  24-F-?72
060 fP  Lou  433  AU  Philippin  - Fifth Poser'  21-ar-72
020  Lou  3500  lCU razil - Su Slow  Hydroelectric  16-May7t
031 CY  Lo  2259  ENP  Cypnas  -Fwth  Powr  13-Jm-i72
0334  09  Loun  17S  lC, Nexico  - Fourth  Poer Sector  Progru  20-Jun-t2
0636  YU  Lo  5113  ENP  Yugqslais  - First Po  trminiu  13iJn
Om 1i  Lou  S144  LCP  Micarau  - Ei9h  Poe  d Lath uke  ecmntructlom  (Part C)  2t-Jun-72
out No  Lou  5060  LCP  born  - Fifth Psr  27-Jim-72
04U1  Ull  Lo  5936  IW  Nieria  -Fowth  Posr  29-JI- 12
ol6  sCU  Lou  4621  LCP  gwav - First Posr  09-Jn-71
060  1a  Lou  2706  LC rasil  - Por  Distribution  aid Subtrnsuission  10-Aar-/J
061016  Lou  3053  LCP  nl  Shlvdr  - Sihth PoW  r  26-Aor-71
09  ZA  Lou  5566  EAW  mbia -Kafue  H  roelctric  (Stae  )'  WOSJul-lI
03  in  Le  4028  E  mrocce First  Power  ll-Sro-f7
094 on  Leo  4246  LCP  Panm  a Third  Posur'  27-Oct-73
0951  IC  Lee  319  ENP  Iceland  - SipeIda  Hydroelectric  11-Oc-13
091 TN  Le  3799  AU  ThailWnd  -on  No  OiM  (Srira  wind) Hydroelectric  02-Apr-74
09c S  mloc  5296  ENP  Syrim  Arab  Republic  - Fint  Mh rdsh  Thermul  Poser  ;6-Apr-7
0991  LL  LIS  5194  ELP  AlWis - First Poser  30-May-74
0999  Po  Lou  3912  ALf  PPuI Me huine - SeondO  POW  10-My-74
102 0a  Los  S833  ENP  lounm  - Fiint  Turceni  Thermul  Poser  JSJul-74
1031  NA  Iee  3506  AEP alaysi  -Sixth Posr  04-Jul  -74
1034  P1  La  441  AEP  Phil  ippins - Sixth  Posr'  02-JuI  -14
1011  0  Low  S060  LCP  onturs  Sisth  Pow  7-Jan-15  .
126  CR  Le  4991  LCP  Costa  Rica  - Fifth Poser'  09-Jun-IS
U44  Srl  Lo  5290  ENP  Syrin Arab  3eoi&c - Second  Mehardeh  Theraul  Poer  17-Juni7S
1147  MC  Low  3505  EAP  Kenya  - Gitaru  Hydroelectric  01-Jul  75
111  NA  Loan  601  ALP  Malaysia  - Seventh  Poser'  02-ODc-15
1194  TV  Lom  5304  EMP  Turkey  - Second  TEK  tramission'  11-v-e15
06  P  Loan  6004  ASP  Pakistan  - Secord  OM  Posr'  10-Feb-16
U125  P  LoN  6125  LCP  Peru  - Fifth  Powr  Project  02-Mr-16
12U  01  Lo  3715  LC,  bolivia  - Fourth  Espru  flacional  de  Electricidd  (EN)  Psr  06-Aor-16.104-
3
List Of ProjeCts  mevime  In 61dlo  Sas. of  Pro*ect  PerforomeI
Lo%W  Audit  Board
Credit  LoanJ Report  Approval
*noer  Credit  It 'tr  Region  Project  1tt  ilte
....  .........  ....  ....  . . .......  .......  . ......... . ...  . ...........  . ............  ........
1257  8  Lozi  5165  LCP  trazil - Power  Distriutimn  (COPl)  11-May-76
1259  IND  Lon  3O0  AEP  Indonsia Fifth Phut'  18-MAY-76
126  ES  Lon  5399  LCP  El Salvadr Seovnth  Poser'  11-jun-76
1293  ML  Loan  5194  EV  Algeria  - Second  Poor  22-Jun-76
1300  Loan  5993  LCP  Bruil  - Northeat  Poexr  Distribution'  24-Jun-76
130:  PO  Loan  4294  ENl  Portugal  - Sixth  Poimr  24-Jun-16
),  TA  Loan  4622  EP  Tnania - K  %sstu  W*droelectric  (Sedon  Staoe)'  01-Jul-76
1343  a  Loa  5695  LCP  bruil  - ELETR1L  Trauision  23-Nor76
1351  CH  Lo  547  LCt  Chile  - Sixth  Por  21-Oec-76
1365  is  Loa  623i  AEP  Inonesi  -Sixth sr  01Fef-77
130 l  Loa  51310  woP  -sm  hW4  ydroelectric  (VEA)  22-PAr-77
131t  Loan  5731  WAP  Gh  - Third  EC  Poer  Distribution  22--
1442  0  Lo  1424f  Ei  m-  Eingimriiptferv  aw 1  iUrbn rSwpl,'  16-Na7
1443  NA  Loa  6241  AE6  Nalwsia  - Eigth  Po-er-7
14S3  E6I  Loa  5110  EiP  Egpt  - Reioal  Electrificatil  oon
1469  YU  Loan  5390  ENM  Yvgslaia  - SecuW  Por Triissie  - n
1531  SYR  Loan  6007  ENi  Syrian  Ara  e  leplic  - Reioal  Eletrification'  14-lr-78
1547  Pll  Lom  5732  AE9  Philiptin - fist  Aural  Electrification  04-Apr-7l
1iS  11  Loan  6253  AV India  -third Trobay  herul  19-Jan  i
1603  Li  Lown  4614  WAP  Lileri  -Firth  Foser  iS-Jtm-78
1629  NO  Lown  5420  LCP  Hondu  -NlIre  Powr  04-Nv-78l
1608  JO  Loan  5172  ENP  Jbd  - Third  Poer  12-Apr-79
1770  TN  Loan  6157  AEP  Thailad  - "he  Lmm  ltdro  27-Nov-79
187  CY  LoU  52  ENI  Cwpw  - Fifth Poowr  12-Jim-SO
2045  EC  Loan  6359  LCP  fcudor  - INEtEl  Pwr Transuision  21-Jul-S1PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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WFS85  Wage  Responsiveness  and  Labor  Market
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Luis  A. Riveros  61762
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Jaime  de  Melo  61539
S90  A Framework  for  Analysis  of  Mineral
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33714
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and  Sector  Review  George  B.  Simmons  September  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Rushikesh  Maru  31091
WPS95  International  Trade  and Imperfect
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in  Developing  Countries  Maureen  A.  Lewis  September  1988  S.  Ainsworth
Genevieve  Kenney  31091
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31021
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Julio  Nogues  33709
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in  Mexico  Anwar  Shah  September  1988  A.  Bhalla
60359
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Ricardo  Paredes  October  1988  R. Luz
61762
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A Survey  Junichl  Goto  October  1988  J.  Epps
33710
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Taeho  Bark  61539
WPS104 Economic Effects  of  Financial  Crises  Manuel Hinds  October  1988  L.  Hovsepian
32979
WPS1O5 Securing  International  Market  Access  Richard  H.  Snape  October  1988  J.  Sweeney
31021
WPS106 Energy  Issues  In  the  Developing  World  Mohan  Munasinghe  January  1989  M.  Fernandez
Robert  J.  Saunders  33637
WPS107 A Review  of World  Bank  Lending  for
Electric  Power  Mohan  Munasinghe  January  1989  M. Fernandez
Joseph  Gilling  33637
Melody  Mason